A necessary truth is one that could not have been false. From an Augustinian perspective, a necessary truth is true in all possible worlds. In other words, from this perspective a necessary truth is true in all worlds that could be actualized.
I argue here and more thoroughly here that CCFs (counterfactuals of creaturely freedom) from a divine causal determinism perspective, being contingent truths, are best viewed as a matter of God’s free knowledge (as opposed to his natural knowledge). Whether person S would freely choose A or ~A in state of affairs C is up to God. Both choices as a matter of God’s good pleasure are possible given the same relevant state of affairs C. From within any possible world W, S would choose A in C is true in some possible worlds; S would choose ~A in C is true in all other possible worlds. As I wrote in that previous entry, “Given a state of affairs God could determine different resultant dispositions to act. Given an identical state of affairs, God could determine a fragrance or song from yesteryear to causally produce a disposition either to look at an old photo album, pick up the phone to call someone or something else. These alternative possibilities would not be indeterminate might-counterfactuals of libertarian creaturely freedom but rather intrinsic possibilities, part of God’s natural knowledge, from which God could determine and freely know any true CCF.”
From a Molinist perspective only feasible worlds can be actualized. Now allowing for that concession within Molinism – that some possible worlds are infeasible worlds due to libertarian freedom, then necessarily, true CCFs are true in all feasible worlds (i.e. worlds that can possibly be actualized into a reality within which instantiated essences could make those free moral choices), but are not necessarily true – need not be true in possible worlds that cannot be actualized (i.e. infeasible worlds that are impossible for God to actualize). Molinism also entails that the counterfactual need not be true even in all feasible worlds given the assertion that would-counterfactuals are not contrary to their use of might-counterfactuals.
Given Molinism, if A would be freely chosen by S given C in one feasible world, that counterfactual would be the case for all feasible worlds. Yet that would make the counterfactual a necessary truth, though not the actualization of it a necessary truth. (Such fixity of counterfactuals is not the case from an Augustinian perspective once we catalog CCFs under God’s free knowledge as opposed to God’s natural knowledge.)
Although within Molinism S might (and therefore might not) choose A given state of affairs C, if S would choose A in C, then the knowability of that would-counterfactual must entail that the truth bearing proposition of the counterfactual be a necessary truth – one that would be true in all feasible worlds. After all, if that were not the case, then knowing state of affairs C (and the workings of S) would not provide the certainty God needs in order to know A would be freely chosen by S under circumstance C.
Within an Augustinian perspective, God knows C would cause S to freely choose A or ~A by sovereign fiat. The outcome would be a contingent truth and as such could vary from W1 to Wn per God’s free choice. Whereas within Molinism, the outcome of S’s free choice given C, being divinely undetermined, is therefore mysteriously fixed as true and, therefore, a necessary truth for all feasible Ws as either always A or else always ~A. Ironic?
Given molinism, although S would A or ~A in C would be purely contingent metaphysically, the proposition that bears the true truth-value of the CCF would be necessary (being the same in all possible actualizeable worlds). From a molinist perspective, in every possible world that is actualizable, the counterfactual is consistently either true or false and, therefore, should be conceded as a necessary truth either of counterfactual S would A or ~A in C. But how can God not be the truth maker of a necessary truth? Brute facts are not facts.
A necessary truth is one that exists in every possible world. And although Molinism upholds a theory of possible worlds that affords room for contingent CCFs (i.e. a would-counterfactual is false or true depending on the possible world in view), if we maintain as a redundant compound statement that (a) necessary truths are truths that exist in every possible world (b) that can possibly be actualized (i.e. a correct view of every possible world!), then the truth value of CCFs in infeasible worlds (worlds that are impossible to actualize), should be disregarded when evaluating whether a counterfactual is a necessary truth.
Molinism may not properly lay claim on CCFs being contingent truths. After all, given LFW, some “possible” choices would never occur regardless of the number of trials. Therefore, those counterfactuals should be deemed necessarily false because they are false in every world that could possibly be actualized. Zero possibility of occurrence is semantically contrary to actual possibility that A would occur or that A might occur.
Within Molinism only feasible worlds can be actualized; yet that semantic concession still must come with the price of considering all relevant CCFs – those CCFs that have a non 0% probability in identical circumstances – as necessary truths given LFW and MK.
At the very least, within Molinism the chasm between what is logically consistent (all possible worlds, including infeasible ones) and what is actually metaphysically feasible (true CCFs) is too vast. For a fuller, more technical treatment of this idea, perhaps consider this.