Philosophical Theology

Kevin DeYoung recently wrote that in 1788, American Presbyterians revised chapter 23 of the original Westminster Confession of Faith (WCF) because many “grew wary of granting coercive powers to the civil magistrate and were drawn to more robust notions of religious liberty”. DeYoung reasons that by virtue of the revision, “Presbyterians in America rejected an older, European model of church-state relations whereby the magistrate was obligated to suppress heresies, reform the church, and provide for church establishments.” DeYoung goes on to say that “it’s important to recognize that the two versions of WCF 23:3 represent two different and irreconcilable views of the civil magistrate.” 

DeYoung cites other changes to the American standards outside chapter 23 and observes that “[the] most significant change is in chapter 23, where the third article was almost completely rewritten, reflecting a new understanding of church and state that allowed for more toleration and gave much less power to the magistrate over the realm of religion.”

First, a clarification is in order, which is not a criticism per se. Given the religious nature of the Westminster standards and sound Presbyterian polity, the church’s subordinate standards neither grant nor deny coercive powers to the civil magistrate. Nor is it true that they “gave much less power to the magistrate over the realm of religion.”

By the nature of the case, confessions are not in a position to do either, though they may acknowledge civil power and declare that it comes from God. 

Not to belabor the point but the purpose of the Confession is to put forth the system of doctrine taught in Scripture, which includes general principles pertaining to the duty and power of the civil magistrate. Consequently, whether the civil magistrate has certain dutiful powers over the church or not, such power is not transferred or taken back by the will of the church. The church may only declare the biblical boundaries of such power. If she tries to grant (or give) it because it is not hers, then it is not hers to give. (In other words, it would have already belonged to the civil magistrate and couldn’t be granted to it by the church.) Yet if the church tries to take it back because it is rightfully hers by divine appointment, then it never truly left her. (The church would merely need to recognize her power and act according to it.)

Consequently, we must be careful in saying that our Presbyterian forefathers “gave much less power to the magistrate over the realm of religion” and “grew wary of granting coercive powers to the civil magistrate and were drawn to more robust notions of religious liberty.” If “granting” and “gave” means allowing, permitting, bestowing etc., then hopefully they didn’t think they granted or gave coercive powers to the civil magistrate. If what was intended by “granting” and “gave” is that they got tired of acknowledging the civil magistrate’s coercive powers, then fine. (Again, this is merely intended to be point of clarification given the common confusion over the ministerial and declarative functions of the church.)

With that clarification aside, my focus as it relates to the article will be on the WCF’s revision that pertains to church and state, with particular attention given to the claim that the two versions (England’s and America’s) are irreconcilable on the matter of religious pluralism. That specific concern will be considered in the larger context of Westminster’s civil ethics. (For brevity sake, I won’t spend time on points of agreement or possible agreement as they relate to the principles of civil ethics.)

The American Revision:

The American revision confesses that Protestant denominations should be protected from being prevented to assemble and worship without violence or danger. The standards further state: “It is the duty of civil magistrates to protect the person and good name of all their people… and to take order, that all religious and ecclesiastical assemblies be held without molestation or disturbance.”

Some have tried to maintain that “all religious and ecclesiastical assemblies” refers back to the duty of civil magistrates to protect only Christian denominations and, therefore, may not be applied to non-evangelical assemblies whether trinitarian or not. For instance, some have argued that the revision does not suggest in any context that public synagogue worship as well as the sacrilege of the Romish mass is to be protected under the law. It seems to me that such a reading of the revision is not only strained but would render the American emendation awkwardly superfluous. If so, then the Confession is stating now, by its revision, that false worship is to be protected under the law. Notwithstanding, if that contradicts the original standards, then it necessarily contradicts WCF 19.4 along with Westminster Larger Catechism 108 (WLC 108).

Before delving into the reason why the revision does not contradict the original with respect to religious pluralism, it might be helpful to consider those two portions of the standards (WCF 19.4 and WLC 108) in order to see how they complement both the original and the revision. 

The duties required in the Second Commandment are…the disapproving, detesting, opposing, all false worship; and, according to each one’s place and calling, removing it, and all monuments of idolatry.

WLC 108

Surprising to most, elders and deacons who subscribe to the Westminsters standards vow to disapprove of all false worship and seek its removal, even through the civil magistrate. Ordained servants also vow, according to WCF 29.4, to consider the mass a corruption of the Lord’s Supper. Consequently, faithful elders and deacons desire to see the centerpiece of Roman Catholic experience lawfully removed from the land. Consequently, faithful ordained servants are in this sense do not advocate for a principle of religious pluralism. Accordingly, I find this troubling:

Gone from WCF 23:3 in the American revision are any references to the civil magistrate’s role in suppressing heresies and blasphemies, in reforming the church, in maintaining a church establishment, and in calling and providing for synods…. In its place, the American revision lists four basic functions for the civil magistrate relative to the church…(4) protect all people so no one is injured or maligned based on his or her religion or lack of religion.

Kevin DeYoung

Given WLC 108 (along with WCF 19.4, which will be touched on momentarily), Christian citizens should do all within their influence to ensure that all heresies, blasphemies and false religions are suppressed. Consequently, if DeYoung is correct regarding the American standards, then not only does it contradict the original, it also contradicts itself!

Because of what WLC 108 clearly states, consistent antinomians who have taken up a similar position to DeYoung‘s have been constrained to limit the scope of WLC 108 to families and the Christian church in order to relieve any possible inconsistency between the alleged pluralism of chapter 23 and the prima facie import of WLC 108, which without qualification declares opposition to all false worship. In other words, in order not to allow the revised standards to contradict itself, WLC 108 has been reinterpreted to mean that only heads of family and presbyters may purge false worship in the home and Christian church respectively, but civil magistrates may not do so as WLC 108 plainly teaches when it speaks of removing all false worship and monuments of idolatry.

Additionally, WCF 19.4 must be reinterpreted as to now oppose its originally intended meaning.

To them also, as a body politic, he gave sundry judicial laws, which expired together with the State of that people; not obliging any other now, further than the general equity thereof may require.

WCF 19.4

Ordained servants who subscribe to the Westminster standards have vowed to believe and teach that civil magistrates are obliged to apply Israel’s civil laws according to their general equity.

In order to reconcile WCF 19.4 with the alleged advocacy of the principle of pluralism found in WCF 23.3, the general equity of Israel’s civil sanctions can no longer apply to modern day civil sanctions. Instead, as Rick Phillips, representative of many ordained servants in the Reformed tradition, has unabashedly stated:

While there is an undisputed wisdom contained in this civil law it can not be made applicable to any nation today, since there are no biblically sanctioned theocracies now…They are transformed into the judicious application of church discipline.

Rick Phillips

Such a rendering cannot be derived from the standards. The claim is exegetically preposterous and has suffered from philosophically dubious argumentation. The translation defies the plain meaning of words and the proof-texts, while cashing out as an outright abrogation of the civil law as opposed to preserving its general equity in the civil sphere. (See also discussion on William Perkins’ use of general equity, the epistemological conundrum and logical incoherence of R2K, and an overview of the disagreement.)

If the intention of the American revision was to commend a biblical principle of pluralism, then it seems odd that non-pluralistic principles within the American standards were not reworked along with WCF 23.3. It seems highly unlikely that the unambiguous requirement of the second commandment should no longer be applied to the civil sphere without a word of explanation by American Presbyterians. Moreover, if American Presbyterians sought to teach that the plain teaching of WCF 19.4 no longer applies to the civil magistrate but instead applies to the church, then it seems axiomatic that such a bald claim must be deduced from the standards and not just assumed and asserted. (Special Pleading: If x then y, but not when it hurts my position.) However, if revision 23.3 does not contradict the original, then we can continue to take WLC 108 and WCF 19.4 at face value without contradiction. That is the common sense approach, especially if it can be shown that the American revision does not oppose the original Confession on the subject of religious pluralism. However, if the revision denies the original, then the revision is inconsistent with other portions of the Westminster standards (given the plain and unaltered portions of WCF 19.4 and WLC 108).

An analogy:

Because the sin of abortion should be a crime, we should do all within our places of influence to overturn laws that support legalized abortion. However, until abortion laws are overturned through righteous means, the civil magistrate is required by God to protect from violent oppressors those who would practice the legalized murder of infants in the womb. Would any Presbyterian disagree with that? Consequently, before abortion was ever even tacitly approved by the state, it could be declared that if anybody takes innocent life, they shall suffer under the penalty of the law. However, where there is the pervasive practice and legal protection of abortion, it can now be rightly said that those who practice the killing of unborn babies shall be protected from “molestation or disturbance” under the law. In other words, abortion clinics should be able to practice their sins with legal protection until such time that the sins are legally considered crimes. Would any Presbyterian disagree with that? (Such a provision does not require Christians to sin; it only protects abortionists from criminal vigilantes as opposed to lawful coercion.)

The principle is that (i) a legal practice that is declared to be protected under the law does not logically imply that (ii) the practice ought not to lose its legal standing under the law, so that (iii) the practice, one day, would no longer be protected under the law. 

By analogy we can apply this reasoning to the American revision to the standards. Although it has been stated that false religions should be free from the threat of “molestation or disturbance”, such does not imply that false worship should be legal. Consequently, the context of mid-seventeenth century England (operating under an Establishment Principle), and late-eighteenth century America (operating under principles of religious pluralism) allows for a consistent revision of WCF 23.3, and one that does not create the need to grossly misinterpret the prima facie rendering of WCF 19.4 and WLC 108 in order to avoid the consistently theonomic import of the standards, even as it relates to the first table of the law and religious pluralism.

We can harmonize the three sections thusly:

The general equity of Israel’s civil law is required by God to be implemented by governments today. (WCF 19.4) This general equity applies even to the first table of the law, with particular relevance to the removal of all public worship that opposes God. (WLC 108) Because we are to submit to government and the laws of our citizenship – it stands to reason that in a pluralistic land, the civil magistrate along with its subjects may not oppress false public worship, even though it should be deemed criminal and ought to be removed per WCF 19.4 and WLC108. (WCF 23.3) In short, all citizens are required by God to desire and seek the legal removal of all worship that publicly opposes the Almighty, which does not contradict the principle of protection under the law.* (WLC 108, WCF 19.3, WCF 23.3)

The context of WCF 23.3:

It seems relevant that the revised standards were adopted between the time of the Virginia Statute For Religious Freedom and Amendment One to the Constitution. Consequently, American Presbyterians were merely declaring true doctrine that was relevant to the context of the already rampant religious pluralism in America, which was rooted in the founding of several of the colonies in the seventeenth century. 

In short, what the Westminster Assembly confessed in London about the civil magistrate in 1646 is not what American Presbyterians confessed in Philadelphia in 1788. The two versions of the Westminster Confession don’t say the same thing, and they cannot both be right.

Kevin DeYoung

Again, my focus with respect to the article is narrow, but the ethical context in which it drops is wide and, I believe, worthy of discussion.

With respect to religious pluralism, the two versions either happily comply or the American revision contradicts other portions of the standards.

The revision to WCF 23.3 no sooner contradicts the original than these two statements contradict each other:

1. All who willfully take innocent life should be put to death by the civil magistrate. (Universal principle)

2. All who abort babies where it is legal should be able to do so without fear of earthly harm. (Contextualized principle)

The larger context of confessional infidelity:

The Westminster standards can become more of an inconvenience than a cherished system of doctrine that strikes amazement in the hearts of elders and deacons.

When I served on “candidates and credentials” in the PCA, I determined no longer to vote for candidates that only subscribe to 8 Commandments (all ten less numbers two and four). And although I am not strictly opposed to voting for candidates that reject Westminster’s civil ethics, it would be refreshing to see an attempt at a reasonable defense for the outright abrogation of the general equity of Israel’s civil law, at least with respect to the second table (i.e, commandments 5-10). However, that subject has become taboo, which has only made discussions pertaining to the first table of the law anathema, along with the rejection of religious pluralism. So, here we are with eight commandments and no firm grasp of how the moral law relates to the sword.

What’s the alternative?

I labor the point because without it we’ll never grasp the sin of the acceptance of religious pluralism. Yet if the rejection of religious pluralism is too frightening to contemplate, then the Westminster civil ethic that necessarily leads to it will not be thoughtfully considered. (The path to the end of religious pluralism begins with prayer and evangelism. Only through the conversion of the nations can there be an end to the public practice of pluralism, if not also laws that protect it. The question isn’t whether this will occur but whether Christians should desire it to occur. It’s not an eschatological question but an ethical one.)

Questions that are conspicuously avoided by those who oppose a Westminster civil ethic:

If R2K ethicists would offer a practical alternative to Westminster civil ethics, the discussion might move forward. (Hand waving never solves anything.)

For although natural law calls for eternal damnation for the least of all transgressions, it is silent with respect to temporal punishment for even the greatest of all transgressions. (1) Therefore, why not a true Westminster general equity civil ethic? (2) At the very least, may nations adopt such laws, just as long as those laws aren’t justified with the Bible? (3) Or, may nations adopt any civil laws, just as long as they don’t resemble the general equity of Israel’s civil laws? (4) Where might we find God’s good opinion on which sins should be deemed crimes? (5) Does God not have an opinion, or has he just not revealed it? (Answers to those sorts of questions will advance the discussion.)

Winding down:

The subject of religious pluralism is part of a larger topic that pertains to the general equity of Israel’s civil law. Consequently, our views on the former aren’t likely to be any better than our perspective on the latter.

In the final analysis it really comes down to three questions:

• Which sins ought to be considered crimes? 
• What should be the punishment for criminal acts? 
• How might we best justify our answers?

All ordained servants should have general answers to those three questions.

Natural Law and fallen autonomous reasoning:

Natural law informs us that the least of all sins deserves God’s wrath. How useful is that in trying to suss out appropriate penal sanctions in a fallen world, which cannot be derived from natural law, especially with respect to the sin of pluralism that necessarily entails blasphemy against the doctrine of the Trinity, which most obviously isn’t a natural revelation! To add to the conundrum, R2Kers correctly maintain that civil magistrates should not punish some sins at all, and all remaining sins should not be punished equally severely. But what is the epistemological basis for these opinions? By R2K standards, God’s preceptive will, presumably rooted in Scripture, is for civil magistrates to determine by the light of fallen nature whether bestiality, homosexual acts and abortion (just to name a few sins) are to be considered purely sins, criminal acts too, or simply amoral. In passing we might consider how successful and unified the nations have been in deriving a “Natural Theology” of sin, crime and penology with respect to perversions, for instance.

Again, which sins ought to be considered crimes…? At the very least, here’s an easy one: How does the Christian justify the death penalty for murder? As soon as the Christian reaches for his Bible to justify capital punishment, how is he not behaving according to a Westminster civil ethic? At which point, the only question is how consistent is his civil ethic?

A semi-common objection to a proper understanding of general equity:

In other words, the Old Covenant, Mosaic death sanctions typify and anticipate the eschatological manifestation of God’s righteous judgment against his enemies.

Lane Tipton

Much can be said. First off, the death penalty preceded Moses. Did the death penalty that preceded Moses typify and anticipate the same eschatological manifestation? If we may apply only pre-mosaic economy civil laws today, how would that not entail a form of special pleading, if not also Dispensationalism? The exception is arbitrary.

Secondly, what about the non-capital offenses that were not sanctioned by death? For instance, I can possibly see how OT civil restitution might typify eschatological judgment in a Roman Catholic sense, but how in a Reformed sense in which there’s no doctrine of purgatory that can identify as the anticipatory eschatological manifestation of OT restitution?!

Finally, since the death penalty preceded Moses and was instituted for violations against God’s image bearers, why should we suppose there is no lasting and intrinsic temporal value for such civil sanctions? Why, in other words, should laws that would be so useful for governing any OT society be considered secondary to typology, or so devalued by the cross of Christ that they lose timeless societal value? After all, if every transgression or disobedience received just retribution, then mustn’t civil sanctions still serve a functional societal purpose simply by virtue of all nations requiring governance before and under God? In a word, is biblical typology all that antithetical to biblical penology? Why not take the common sense approach that the civil laws given to Israel were to be a model in their general equity to neighboring nations and all nations today? Why shouldn’t the nations be fully discipled? (Again, the three questions from above.)

How does the cross make foolish the wisdom of God?

Deuteronomy 4:1-8 teaches that the wisdom of God’s law is to be an example to the nations. Are we to infer from Deuteronomy 4:1-8 that non-theocratic nations are to admire the wisdom of Israel’s laws but should not model them? In other words, are non-theocratic nations to praise God for the wisdom of his laws, yet not desire equitable implementation? Or should they be implemented, just covertly and without scriptural justification? Would God be pleased, displeased or have no opinion if all nations sought justice in accordance to the general equity of Israel’s civil laws?

And now, O Israel, listen to the statutes and the rules that I am teaching you, and do them, that you may live, and go in and take possession of the land that the LORD, the God of your fathers, is giving you. You shall not add to the word that I command you, nor take from it, that you may keep the commandments of the LORD your God that I command you. Your eyes have seen what the LORD did at Baal-peor, for the LORD your God destroyed from among you all the men who followed the Baal of Peor. But you who held fast to the LORD your God are all alive today. See, I have taught you statutes and rules, as the LORD my God commanded me, that you should do them in the land that you are entering to take possession of it. Keep them and do them, for that will be your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the peoples, who, when they hear all these statutes, will say, ‘Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people.’ For what great nation is there that has a god so near to it as the LORD our God is to us, whenever we call upon him? And what great nation is there, that has statutes and rules so righteous as all this law that I set before you today?

Deuteronomy 4:1-8

So, no, the American revision to the WCF does not contradict the 1647 standards on the question of religious pluralism, lest the 1788 American Presbyterians worked themselves into a theological frenzy over the revision. They were simply working in a different pluralistic context, which did not undermine the civil realm ideals set forth in WCF 19.4 and WLC 108.

* Some fear Westminster civil ethics because of perceived implications that aren’t always accurate. With that in mind, it might be useful to note some common misguided arrows about Westminster civil ethics: 

+ Westminster civil ethics are not eschatologically dependent. Which is to say, a doom and gloom amillennialist can hold to a Westminster civil ethic because the question turns not on how things might end up but on how things ought to be.

+ Contrariwise, a postmillennialist can believe that we are to be governed by solely natural law in the civil realm. 

+ Westminster civil ethics are not inexorably tied to cultural transformation. Which is to say, one can believe that such civil laws will never possibly be legislated until the church first believes that they should. And even then, there’s always the eschatological question of future Christian influence in society.

+ To argue against Westminster civil ethics because Federal Visionists hold to it is about as reasonable as arguing against Trinitarianism because Federal Visionists hold to it. Yet that’s how certain “historians” argue. 

+ That Muslims might want to see the world oppressively governed by the Koran is irrelevant to whether God’s people should desire that the general equity of God’s civil laws be legislated lawfully and not by force.

+ Capital punishment is not contrary to the Great Commission, for anyone on death row should be pleaded with to turn from their sins and receive Christ as he is offered in the gospel. 

+ That some Christians find the prospect of certain civil sanctions repulsive for today raises the question of whether these same Christians would have delighted in such laws had they lived under Moses. It seems to me that Christians who mock the notion of such laws for today have shown themselves incapable of contemplating the intrinsic wisdom and goodness of such laws prior to the cross. Their disdain is trans-testament.