Compatibilism
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Of God’s Eternal Decree In Light Of Four Commentaries on WCF 3.2. Have we drifted?
It has been my contention for many years that the doctrine of God’s eternal decree is widely misunderstood, even unwittingly denied, within the Reformed tradition. Having served on a pastoral search committee in the OPC and candidates and credentials team in the PCA at the presbyterial level, I’ve seen a fair share of candidates for… Continue reading
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An Essential Tenet Of Reformed Theology *Is* Determinism. The Reformed Need To Embrace It.
When it comes to the question of whether Reformed theology entails a principle of determinism, either disagreement abounds among Reformed theologians or else many within the tradition are talking by each other. Perhaps some are in theological agreement over this essential aspect of Reformed theology while expressing themselves in conflicting ways. Perhaps. Regardless, there is… Continue reading
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Apologetics Discussion
Arne Verster of Apologetics Central and I discussed apologetics (last evening for me, this morning for Arne who lives in South Africa). This article of mine on the failure of classical apologetics was the impetus for our discussion. Continue reading
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John Davenant, Another Enticement For The “Reformed” (in name only)
“If it be denied that Christ died for some persons, it will immediately follow, that such could not be saved, even if they should believe.” I can understand Arminians saying such a thing but when those who profess to be Reformed say things like that, more than bad theology is at play. (And by the… Continue reading
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Dr. James Anderson Dismantles Opposition to Presuppositional Apologetics, Theological Determinism and Christ’s Kingly Reign Over All
It’s never pleasurable to read (i) caricatures, (ii) misunderstandings, (iii) reckless treatment of opposing views and (iv) badly formulated arguments – especially by other Christians. It is pleasurable, however, given such grave misfortune, to read precise interaction with such positions. One wonderful thing about James’s work is his points of disagreement are always precisely articulated.… Continue reading
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Moving beyond Sproulian Compatibilism
Below are excerpts from R.C. Sproul’s, What Is Free Will? We have seen Edwards’ [1700s] view and Calvin’s view [1500s], so now we’ll go into the Sproulian view of free will by appealing to irony, or to a form of paradox… I would like to make this statement: in my opinion, every choice that we… Continue reading
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5 Point Molinists & Pervasive Confusion
I have been convinced for well over a decade not only that many professing Calvinists are latent Molinists but that most are. Here we find what I believe to be a representative sample of how Calvinists relate free will to the decree of God. The author of the piece earned a Masters in Divinity (minor… Continue reading
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Libertarian Freedom and Properly Basic Beliefs, an analogy of unlikely bedfellows
It’s interesting that many libertarians subscribe to properly basic beliefs that are formed in us but not strictly by us, which they’d say we are nonetheless morally responsible to live by. But how can such incompatibilists consistently maintain that we can justly be held responsible for such unwilled beliefs if we may not be held… Continue reading
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Libertarian free will, regress or crickets?
Libertarians and Compatibilists can agree that there are two distinct components when choices come to fruition, (a) an intention to act and (b) a specific act that proceeds from an intention. An actual act of the will comes from an intention to make a willed act. Intention to act —> act of the will Without… Continue reading
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What drives libertarian freedom, moral responsibility or determinism?
What seems to drive Libertarians to their view of freedom is not the reasonableness of pure contingency. It’s seems intuitive that compatibilist freedom provides the sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. I don’t think many libertarians would have looked any further than to those conditions if determinism wasn’t part of the discussion. In other words, if… Continue reading
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From whence come intentions, and how is compatibilism any better in this regard?
This post aims to address how unchosen intentions can be rational and person-relevant from a compatibilist perspective but not from a libertarian perspective. Even though morally significant intentions are formed within the agent, they are not formed strictly by the agent, being ultimately sourced and caused from without the agent. Secondly, libertarian freedom would undermine… Continue reading
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Natural Knowledge or Free Knowledge of CCFs?
Natural Knowledge: God’s knowledge of all necessary truths, including all possibilities logically prior to his creative decree. Definition from Divine Foreknowledge Four Views, Edited by Beilby & Eddy, page 211. God knows all possible worlds according to his natural knowledge. Yet many Reformed thinkers tend to extend natural knowledge to the objects of counterfactuals of… Continue reading
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Assume I’m a Molinist!
Why are these three points insufficient for human responsibility from an Arminian perspective? Assume I were a Molinist asking the question! All three of those points are compatible with God’s eternal decree. Accordingly, how does a Reformed view of divine decree logically contradict moral accountability given that 1-3 would appear sufficient for moral accountability? To… Continue reading
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Molinist Counterfactual Backfires
Christian compatibilists and incompatibilists agree that man is morally responsible for his choices, and God has exhaustive foreknowledge of the same. Therefore, if man has free will, it must be compatible with God’s exhaustive foreknowledge. “It seems to me much clearer(!)” – and to the rest who desire to make sense of God’s knowledge of… Continue reading
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Molinism, Dualism and Omniscience
At the heart of Molinism is Middle Knowledge (MK), God’s knowledge of true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) – i.e. God’s knowledge of what creatures would freely do under all sets of circumstances. Now, of course, Augustinians also believe that if there are CCFs, then an omniscient God must have knowledge of them. However, unlike… Continue reading
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Middle Knowledge and Calvinism
Middle Knowledge (MK) is God’s knowledge of all true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCF). As the word middle suggests, this knowledge falls between other types of knowledge. Specifically, MK is situated between God’s natural knowledge, which is God’s knowledge of all necessary truths and possibilities and God’s free knowledge, which is (or as I will… Continue reading
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Free Will and Compatibilism, a brief sketch
Discussions on “free will” inevitably lead to analysis of (a) moral responsibility, (b) the limits of metaphysical freedom – from autonomy and pure contingency to necessity and causality, and (c) divine foreknowledge. What is indubitable is that moral agents, when they choose, are morally accountable. Therefore, if determinism is true, then determinism must be compatible… Continue reading