Philosophical Theology

It has been my contention for many years that the doctrine of God’s eternal decree is widely misunderstood, even unwittingly denied, within the Reformed tradition. Having served on a pastoral search committee in the OPC and candidates and credentials team in the PCA at the presbyterial level, I’ve seen a fair share of candidates for licensure, ordination and pastoral calls not be able to distinguish themselves from Molinists when it comes to the decree of God. My experiences that inform my conclusion go beyond serving in those capacities. That is to say, I believe my concerns are considerably informed on this matter. In an effort to get others to perhaps share my concerns, so that maybe a small sphere of influence might gain heightened awareness, I have surveyed the theology of four commentaries spanning 150 years on an essential portion of the Westminster Confession of Faith (WCF), specifically WCF 3.2 (hereon referred to as 3.2). Below I offer observations by way of comparison. I believe the one contemporary commentary on 3.2 distinguishes itself from the other three commentaries and is, I believe, representative of the general understanding of the doctrine of the divine decree in the Reformed church today.

The first two commentaries were written and published in the mid 1800s. The third was first published in 1964, so it’s relatively new (though nearly sixty years old). The final commentary is from this century, published in 2014. I find striking similarities between the first three regarding their respective interpretations of 3.2 as well with their emphases. Whereas the contemporary commentary is, I believe, more than a bit troubling with respect to theological and philosophical concepts, and the subsequent doctrine put forth. The doctrine put forth not only overlooks the distinctly Reformed points of the other three, it actually opposes them.

Before we get to the commentaries, it might be a useful exercise to just ask yourself what would it take for someone to convince you that he embraced a Reformed view of the divine decree? What diagnostic questions might you ask to tease out what one believes on this matter? Or more simply considered, how would you distinguish a Reformed theology of the decree from a non-Reformed Christian theology of the decree? Because it might come as a surprise, Molinists (which for our purposes are very sophisticated Arminians) believe God is sovereign and that by decreeing whatsoever comes to pass has foreordained all of history. Perhaps surprising to most, non-Reformed theology makes room for statements such as:

God has a purpose for all that occurs. In fact, God hasn’t just allowed evil in the world, God has sovereignly decreed a world with evil, but God will use it for his own glory. Indeed, God could have brought into existence (or actualized) any number of possible worlds, as his choices were truly infinite, but God was pleased to sovereignly decree this one. In accordance with God’s decree some were chosen in Christ and predestined according to the purpose of God’s will.

Hypothetical Confession

As you might gather, other traditions can on the surface offer very attractive forms of God’s sovereignty and human freedom. With that observation comes a significant takeaway. It’s inadequate to consider such a generic confession of the divine decree as sufficiently Reformed. The question is, what is meant by certain words and phrases, and what key features, if any, are absent? Words and phrases like predestined, elect, chosen, and predeterminate counsel are plainly put forth in Scripture. So much so, Calvinists and non-Calvinists cannot avoid incorporating them into their discourse. Consequently, it’s not very informative for one to say she believes God is sovereign, or that “God has a purpose in all of this”. Even the phrase “It was God’s will that this happened” does not disclose what one believes about God’s will. Much of what is written and spoken today by confessing Calvinists about God’s decree, providence and electing grace is insufficient to convict or acquit one on the charge of Calvinism. (For instance, this Ligonier article puts forth a view of God’s sovereignty as being distinctly Reformed. Yet any Molinist can affirm the article’s theology of decree. Even the portion that deals with election is questionable.)

There is a vast difference between (a) God having allowed something to occur that he could have prevented and (b) God having determined that something occur. Both ideas entail God’s sovereign will, but only the second explicitly puts forth a Reformed picture of the divine decree. The Reformed and non-Reformed can agree on the first expression of God’s will and sovereignty, but not on the second one.

Our key passage in the Westminster standards:

Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions; yet has He not decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.

3.2

Regarding 3.2, Robert Letham notes:

Both Helm and Fesko correctly identify Molinism as the target of the final clause. Following Luis de Molina (1535-1600), this was the proposition that God’s decrees were based on his knowledge of all possible future actions.*

The Westminster Assembly: Reading its Theology in Historical Context (pages 184-185)

If the target of the final clause is Molina’s Molinism, then the “knowledge of all future actions” refers to scientia media (middle knowledge). Consequently, the Confession opposes any view of the decree that includes God receiving knowledge about any contingency, including the free choices of men.

Comments on four commentaries:

The commentators will simply be referred to as C 1,2,3 and 4. Their works are widely known in Reformed circles and I see no purpose in drawing attention to the authors. My particular hope is to heighten awareness and foster further interest in a doctrine that should invoke our highest praise as it reflects God’s matchless glory. To that end, I believe due attention should be given to how far we have drifted from our theological predecessors, assuming C4 is an adequate reflection of contemporary thinking among those who profess to be Reformed.

Unfortunately, I believe certain teachings must be addressed with critical precision. It’s in that spirit I proceed without pleasure, other than with the hope that this exercise might bear fruit.

Commentator 1:

Out of the blocks, C1 equated the divine decree with God’s determination of things that will occur. “By the decree of God is meant his purpose or determination with respect to future things.” In other words, C1 was a theological determinist. Which is to say, God does not merely permit the free choices of men. Rather, God determines their outcomes independently of the creature. “If God be an independent being, all creatures must have an entire dependence upon him…”

Secondly, C1 recognized that had God not determined all that would come to pass, God could not foreknow the future as certain. For C1, God’s exhaustive omniscience is predicated upon his sovereign and independent determination of would-counterfactuals including the actual future free acts of men. “God could not foreknow that things would be, unless he had decreed they should be…” For C1, if it were otherwise the case, there could be no surety of outcome. “…for if they had not been determined upon, they could not have been foreknown as certain.”

Thirdly, C1 believed man has free will when he “acts without any constraint, and according to his own free choice…” Consequently, and lastly, C1 was a compatibilist. C1 believed man’s free choices are compatible with God’s determination of them: “that the divine decree…while it secures the futurition of events, it leaves rational agents to act as freely as if there had been no decree.…” As a compatibilist, C1 rejected an indeterminist view of freedom, which entails a philosophy of freedom that grounds contingency in the creature as opposed to in God’s free determination. In other words, C1 rejected that a choice that would occur might not occur because of indeterminate creaturely freedom: “the execution of the decree of God is not suspended upon any condition which may or may not be performed.”

Commentator 2:

C2 took things to another level by expounding more deeply on the points he had in common with C1. Like C1, C2 mapped the certainty of future events to the sovereign determination of them: “while at the same time, [the decree] makes the entire system of events, and every element embraced in it, certainly future.”

Secondly, C2 understood that for God to know that an event would occur, God must causally determine the event to ensure its future outcome. “But the all-comprehensive purpose of God embraces and determines the cause and the conditions, as well as the event suspended upon them… Calvinists affirm that he foresees them to be certainly future because he has determined them to be so.”

Thirdly, C2 specifically argued that God determines the relationship of cause to effect. In other words, for C2, it is the decree of God that makes even contingent events contingent! “The decree, instead of altering, determines the nature of events, and their mutual relations. It makes free actions free in relation to their agents, and contingent events contingent in relation to their conditions.” (In contemporary philosophical parlance, there are no brute facts. God pre-interprets the particulars and wills their relationship of cause and effect.)

Lastly, because C2 understood that man acts freely, C2 believed freedom is compatible with the robust determinism he avowed. “Now, that a given free action is certainly future, is obviously not inconsistent with the perfect freedom of the agent in that act: Because all admit that God certainly foreknows the free actions of free agents, and if so, they must be certainly future, although free…”

Commentary 3:

In an economy of words, C3 taught “that God has predetermined all things that happen.” C3 understood that God’s sovereign determination of choices does not destroy genuine freedom. For C3, “The free actions of men are also predestined by God. Please note: these acts are both free and predestined…” And as his predecessors from the century before, C3 grounded God’s foreknowledge of future contingencies in the sovereign determination of God. “God knows that a thing is certain to happen before it happens, we may then ask, what makes it certain? There can be but one answer: God makes it certain. We are unable to escape the conclusion that God foresees with certainty only because he guarantees with certainty.”

Like those who preceded him in the tradition, C3 was a theological determinist and compatibilist, which is to say he affirmed free will while denying indeterminism and, consequently, the ability to choose otherwise (libertarian freedom).

All 3 commentators:

These pastors and theologians based the certainty of God’s exhaustive omniscience upon the guarantees afforded to him by a deterministic decree. They did not yield an inch to the idea that God knows what men will do because of a supposed middle knowledge that is logically prior to his creative decree. When one reads these men, the most striking feature is their unwavering conviction that divine determinism is at the heart of the divine decree. Without it, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for them to have portrayed the Reformed view of the divine decree. Determines or predetermines is throughout each of the expositions of 3.2. One commentary included seventeen references to a form of the word determine in his exposition along with a couple of synonyms! Ironically, divine determinism is rarely mentioned anymore in Reformed circles today unless it’s being questioned or denied.

Natural knowledge, middle knowledge and free knowledge:

Before interacting with the fourth and final commentary, it might be helpful to consider some terms and concepts when it comes to God’s knowledge. Without being familiar with specific terms of art, it’ll be difficult to notice the significant missteps in the fourth commentary and ascertain just how far we may have drifted from perhaps the most distinguishing feature of Reformed theology as compared to other evangelical traditions.

From a Reformed perspective God has natural knowledge and free knowledge. That’s it. There’s nothing between the two because there is nothing more to be had. There is no “middle knowledge” that can be situated between what God necessarily knows by nature and what God freely knows by creative decree. Those two categories of divine knowledge are all-encompassing. They pertain to what God must know (necessarily), and what God freely knows (according to his independent-sovereign will). Whereas middle knowledge entails God eternally acquiring from uncreated persons the knowledge of actualizable (feasible) free choices.

God’s natural knowledge includes God’s knowledge of all necessary truths and possibilities. For instance, God is triune. That is a necessary truth because it is not possible that God does not exist and be triune. A good test to ascertain whether something is a necessary truth is to ask ourselves whether there is a “possible world” in which it does not exist. (We can simply define a possible world as a consistent and complete reality that might have been. Obviously, God naturally knows all of them.) Since the triune God exists in all possible worlds, the Trinity is a necessary being, which God knows naturally without creatively willing its truth.

Other truths that God knows naturally are all possibilities. Here again, God knows them without exercising his creative will. Surely, there are an “infinite number” of possible worlds in which you or I don’t exist, or in which you do exist but would not have formed an intention to read this article under the same exact conditions that you decided to read this article. Maybe that world is looking better to you now (!), but hopefully that’ll change if you read on.

So, God knows all necessary truths and all possibilities. But there’s one more piece to the puzzle that completes God’s omniscience. God has free knowledge.

God’s free knowledge:

The object of God’s free knowledge is his creative decree. God has free knowledge of the world he chose to actualize out of all possible worlds.

For instance, that I would freely write this article if placed in these identical circumstances is not a truth that God had to know, otherwise it would be a necessary truth. Accordingly, God knew I would write this article under these precise circumstances because he freely decreed that I would do so if certain circumstances were met. By also decreeing that the conditions would be met, God turned what merely would occur into what will occur. God freely determined to causally bring to pass a future contingency by ensuring the conditions for fruition were actually met.**

The takeaway is, it’s not as though God foreknew what I would do through (a) middle knowledge, (b) some divine intuition or (c) because of an intimate knowledge of my personal preferences. Nor did God foreknow it because (d) he transcends time, and the future is all before him. Those sorts of explanations are pervasive but they’re contrary to 3.2 and a denial of the Reformed view of God’s independence and foreknowledge, which is grounded in causal divine determinism.

So, as we gleaned from the three previous commentaries, God knows the future free choices of men because he has sovereignly and independently determined the free choices of men. Contingent truths become actualized and causally secure by God’s free determination. This distinctly Reformed view is consistent, coherent, and explanatory, but most importantly biblical! As such, theological determinism is worthy of our understanding and even our ardent, yet gracious, defense.

Fast forward fifty years from C3 to a more contemporary commentary on the Confession.

Now keep in mind, this is not a review of the fourth commentary. (Reviews are available online.) My aim is to interact with C4’s teaching on 3.2 because that portion, perhaps more than any other portion of the Confession, distinguishes a Reformed view of the divine decree from a Molinist view of the divine decree. And again, it’s my belief that the divine decree more than any other doctrine distinguishes the Reformed tradition from all other evangelical traditions. (The Five Points of Calvinism are a mere subset of this Reformed doctrine.)

However, God does not only know all that has happened and will happen. He also knows all that could happen (what used to be called ‘middle knowledge’)…. there is no scenario which God does not already know. (1 Samuel 23:11,12; see also Matt. 11:21-23)

C4

It is historically, philosophically, and theologically mistaken to think that what could happen used to be called middle knowledge.

Let’s clear up some misunderstandings and try to clarify some terms and concepts.

1. Whether one is a Calvinist or a Molinist, what could happen is not an object of middle knowledge but an object of natural knowledge. A knowledge of what could happen is a knowledge of possibilities. (Perhaps what is intended by “could happen” is the concept of “would happen”. We can run with that.)

2. For the Reformed, even what would happen is not an object of middle knowledge but, rather, what would happen is a matter of free knowledge. That’s because from a Reformed perspective what would happen is based upon God’s creative decree. (Not all would-counterfactuals must come to pass.)

3. In direct opposition to Reformed thought, Molinism maintains that what would happen under defined circumstances is not a matter of the creative decree but a matter of God’s alleged middle knowledge. Objects of middle knowledge are posited as pre-volitional objects of divine knowledge. They entail truth values that are independent of God’s will, which God mysteriously receives in eternity and then has to work with or around.

So why middle knowledge?

There is a reason that Molinism requires middle knowledge. Molinists want to uphold God’s exhaustive omniscience, which Scripture clearly teaches, while denying that God determines the free actions of men. Molinists deny theological determinism because they don’t believe a determined choice can be a free and morally relevant choice. (I address that here.)

Accordingly, if God does not know the choices men would freely make under all conditions because he has determined them, then God would have to acquire his knowledge elsewhere if God is to have foreknowledge. Hence the genius of middle knowledge, but at the cost of God’s independence from his creation. It should be apparent, middle knowledge denies a Reformed understanding of what it is for God to be independent and most free. (WCF 2.1,2)

From a Reformed perspective, the philosophical implications of middle knowledge, which presuppose libertarian freedom and not a compatibilist form of freedom, would be devastating to the vitals of our religion. God would not be independent. God would not be exhaustively omniscient (as Open Theists acknowledge). Man would have autonomous freedom, which would undermine the intelligibility of moral accountability (as argued here).

Though God knows every possible conditional, every possible ‘if…then’ statement, these conditionals do not influence him. He makes his decisions apart from them. The knowledge of God does not bind him. We serve the God who is entirely free.

C4

This statement cannot be reconciled with the avowed doctrine of middle knowledge. If God knows every possible conditional according to his middle knowledge, then God is dependent upon his creation and it is false that “He makes his decisions apart from them.” Indeed, these conditionals would influence and bind God! We would not “serve the God who is entirely free.”

But even from a Reformed perspective we cannot salvage this. That God is most free does not mean he makes decisions “apart from [conditionals].” After all, knowledge of counterfactuals presupposes truth; truth is of God; and God cannot deny himself! For example, from a Reformed perspective if God knows Judas would betray Jesus under the conditions Judas betrayed Jesus, then that is a decretive counterfactual that God may or may not causally bring to pass. And logically prior to God knowing it according to his free knowledge, he knows it according to his natural knowledge as a possibility. Notwithstanding, being a true counterfactual, it is false that “[God] makes his decisions apart from them.” In fact, God honored the counterfactual in his decree to redeem a people for his name. But that should not surprise us when we realize that God’s decree takes into account possibilities and the conditionals that he has determined in order to fulfill his eternal plan and purpose. God can no sooner make his decisions apart from his knowledge of counterfactuals than he can achieve his decretive ends without taking into account his decretive means.

Two ways we might go with this:

1. Within Molinism God is bound by such conditionals over which he has no control. God must play the cards he is dealt. Molinists agree.

2. Whereas Reformed theology entails God being true to his holy will of decree, of which true conditionals, which he determines, are integral. Within a Reformed framework, certain if-then conditionals become the cards God deals to himself and, therefore, he does not make his decisions apart from their possibility, actuality and eventuality.

In ether case, the sentiment is at best confused if not patently false.

In closing this section, we can make the following observations:

1. God knows what could happen according to his natural knowledge of possibilities.

2. God knows what will happen according to his free knowledge of his decree. In other words, God knows the future because he has freely and independently determined the future from the set of all possibilities, which God knows according to natural knowledge.

3. Because free moral agents have compatibilist freedom, God has free knowledge of would-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom that is based upon his sovereign and independent determination, and not according to a middle knowledge of undetermined counterfactuals that have no eternal source for their existence.

Peace, peace when there is no peace:

The decree of God has been the subject of too much debate in the history of the church. The reality is that the parties in the disputes are often much closer to one another than they admit. The happy truth is that those who dispute the absolute lordship of God, check their arguments at the door when they enter their closets to pray.

C4

I would love to agree, but I just can’t. I believe the decree of God has not been subject to enough charitable debate, especially in recent church history, hence this present lament. Perhaps the reason that one believes Arminians and Calvinists are “closer” than the historical disputes portray them to be is because today we don’t appreciate the theological differences with the same understanding as did our fathers in the Reformed faith.

Consistent Arminians pray in ways much different than us. For instance, they do not pray that God would override the free will of man, or take out the heart of stone from their unsaved loved ones and replace it with a heart of flesh. But they do pray that men will come under conviction so that they might repent (albeit autonomously). More examples could be given, but we may safely note that bad theology can turn prayer petitions into celestial cheerleading.

(In defense of non-Calvinists, they don’t “dispute the absolute lordship of God…” They don’t even deny that God decrees whatsoever comes to pass!)

The reality is that the parties in these disputes are often much closer to one another than they admit…The sad truth is that those who defend a doctrine of divine sovereignty often complain when things do not go their own way, forgetting that they’re grumbling is against God.

C4

When the Reformed betray their theology by kicking against God’s providences, such behavior does not place them in closer theological proximity to Arminians. It only shows that Calvinists can behave like Arminians. Calvinists can also behave like humanists. But I’m not sure what an inconsistency in practice proves with respect to similarities between opposing creeds.

I appreciate the conciliatory olive branch, but it just doesn’t work for me. On this particular issue, the parties in dispute are not close at all. At least one party is in great doctrinal error as the two adhere to contrary views of God and man. There is a reason there are so few confessional Molinist-Calvinist churches in the world. (Are there even any? Should there be more?)

Closing out on C4:

Perhaps C4 didn’t know that middle knowledge presupposes indeterminism and libertarian freedom, thereby constituting an outright rejection of free knowledge of decretive counterfactuals. Perhaps he believed that middle knowledge stakes out no other ground than knowledge of counterfactuals, and how that knowledge is acquired by God is not essential to middle knowledge. Or maybe he just hadn’t considered the “logical moments” of the formulation of the divine decree, or why Molinists situate middle kowledge between natural knowledge and free knowledge. I really don’t know. What I do know is that what is absent in C4’s treatment of 3.2 is theological determinism, which is the most prominent feature of the Reformed position because it corroborates God’s independence and grounds his exhaustive foreknowledge. And what is present in C4’s treatment of 3.2 is an affirmation of middle knowledge, which is a doctrine that replaces confessional determinism and compatibilist freedom with indeterminism and libertarian freedom. So, both negatively and positively, whether intentionally or not, C4’s articulation is decidedly against the Confession on 3.2. (Even if C4’s discussion on 3.2 was targeted to a broad-base audience, I don’t see how that could possibly change things.)

I’ll briefly turn to two others who’ve been more intentional with their theories that move away from the Westminster standards.

Historian Richard Muller along with Oliver Crisp have offered what I believe to be intentional challenges to the Reformed view of the decree as it relates to theological determinism and compatibilist freedom. Their views have been decidedly addressed by analytic philosophers in the Reformed tradition (James Anderson and Paul Manata), who are more than equipped for the task. Here is a four part interaction with Crisp’s Libertarian Calvinism. Here and here are interactions with Muller. Here is a scholarly co-authored article on Libertarian Calvinism.

Notwithstanding those devastating refutations, theological determinism has been increasingly questioned and even fallen out of dogmatic favor in certain Reformed circles partly due to the influence of historical revisionism and spurious philosophical-theology. (I am not referring to C4 here.)

In Closing:

Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of Reformed theology is its doctrine Of God’s Eternal Decree. Whereas Rome and Protestant communions can find formal agreement on the Person of Christ, Theology Proper, and with varying degree on the sacraments – when it comes to the Reformed doctrine Of God’s Eternal Decree Trinitarian communions are on a collision course. Indeed, one’s understanding of the divine decree will inform one’s understanding of free will, moral accountability, the fall of man, providence, faith and repentance, and more. This doctrine, also, has profound pastoral implications in a world of sin and suffering. We simply cannot afford to get this doctrine wrong.

Current trends due to a lack of analytic theology:

For in large part, the attention given to the Reformed doctrine of the divine decree is not attended to with the care it once was. The contemporary philosophical-theological approach to doctrine has not just given way to an unchecked biblical theology that at times resembles process theology. There is, also, an over emphasis on the historical development of theological systems rather than actually doing systematic theology. With respect to the former trend or emphasis, one byproduct is that God takes on covenant properties by which he can be acted upon and suffer. Ministries to the oppressed have with good intention, yet unwittingly, latched onto such heresies in order to offer comfort to victims in need.

Regarding the latter trend, I have found that being able to reference historical theological figures and positions can become more essential to a Reformed reputation than understanding the theological implications of their systems. One needn’t be able to identify and defend the correct side of a theological dispute just long as he can reference the historical debates. Consequently, libertarian freedom, indeterminism, hypothetical universalism, the peccability of Christ and other aberrant views have gained a seat at the Reformed table.

Brothers and sisters, we can do better than this. Indeed, we must do better than this. And by God’s grace, we shall do better than this.

* “Both Helm and Fesko correctly identify Molinism as the target of the final clause. Following Luis de Molina (1535-1600), this was the proposition that God’s decrees were based on his knowledge of all possible future actions.” Letham

First, it’s in Reformed thought (not Molinism) that God’s decrees must take into account possible free actions. We might ask, how can God create without first knowing what is possible for him to create?  In that sense his decrees are based upon his knowledge of possibilities. In short, God cannot decree without first knowing what is possible for him to decree. So, creative decree is based upon possibilities in Reformed thought. (Obviously this is logical order, not temporal order.) 

With respect to Molinism that’s not the case even though God’s knowledge of possible creaturely free actions is pre-volitional and, therefore, logically prior to the creative decree (as it is in Reformed theology). However, for Molinism, and here’s the takeaway, the decrees admittedly cannot be based solely upon God’s prior knowledge of possible free actions because not all possible free actions can be actualized within Molinism. This gets into their distinction between possibility and feasibility. 

In Molinism, God knows all possible choices according to his natural knowledge. Within the set of possibilities is a subset of infeasibilities that make God’s knowledge of all possible choices insufficient to inform God of what he can actualize. Remember, God needs middle knowledge in order to know what creatures would (actually) freely choose under all possible circumstances. So, in contemporary Molinism possible choices aren’t all that informative to God. Such possibilities are situated in consistent and purely theoretical realities of what could be, but not all those possibilities are feasible or actualizable. In other words, in Molinism God can actualize only possibilities but not all possibilities! 

** “…God knew I would write this article under these precise circumstances because he freely decreed that I would do so if certain circumstances were met. By also decreeing that the conditions would be met, God turned what merely would occur into what will occur. God freely determined to causally bring to pass a future contingency by ensuring the conditions for fruition were actually met.”” Me

1. If the conditions for fruition were not met (let’s say an emergency directed my attention elsewhere), then my choice to freely write this article at this time would not have obtained (assuming the antecedent conditions were not just sufficient but also necessary). Such an actual state of affairs would entail another possible world, Pw1, which would be different than this actual possible world, PwA. The question arises whether there is a decretive truth value for what I would have done had the relevant conditions for fruition had been different. In other words, does God’s creative decree include would-counterfactuals that will not occur? If it doesn’t, then God would not know what I would have done under other conditions. Of course, that wouldn’t limit God’s exhaustive omniscience. It would simply mean that God does not assign truth values to possibilities that he doesn’t causally ensure will come to pass. However, if God does know the outcome of conditionals that don’t come to pass, then God’s decree is more encompassing than all that will come to pass. Scripture affirms the latter. 

Matthew 11:21 can serve as an example of decreed would-counterfactual that never did occur although it would have occurred had certain conditions been met. (I do think, however, that this offers a better interpretation of the primary import of passage: https://philosophical-theology.com/2021/04/17/molinist-counterfactual-backfires/ I don’t think Jesus was making a metaphysical claim, but rather issuing a rebuke with rhetorical force. 

2. A common misunderstanding among Calvinists is in thinking that a contingent truth cannot be causally necessary. That’s to conflate concepts. From a Reformed perspective a contingent truth is one God decrees to be true. It’s not a necessary truth or one that is true in every possible world. Notwithstanding, when counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are decreed along with their antecedent causes, the choice remains a contingent truth, but nonetheless it cannot be otherwise because it’s causally secure. Many Calvinists wrongly believe that because a choice is a contingent truth, it must be free in a libertarian sense.