The Logical-Possible Chasm of Molinism

Consider counterfactual of creaturely freedom (CCF) p: If person S were in state of affairs C, S would freely A.

C represents the relevant history of the world prior to S freely doing A. Within Molinism, given C, S always As. Therefore, if God wills S would freely A, God need only actualize S in C since S in C never results in ~A. This necessity is not true of Augustinianism given that within divine causal determinism p is an object of God’s free knowledge, which is grounded in God’s creative decree and not his Middle Knowledge of fixed brute facts. Of course, Molinism does offer a way around such sufficient-condition necessity, which requires indexing the set of all might-counterfactuals that do not intersect would-counterfactuals to un-actualizeable infeasible worlds. The aim of this post is to explain why Molinism needs such possible-infeasible worlds and to expose such an escape hatch.

The two-fold ambition of Molinism:

For Molinism to lay claim on the doctrine of God’s exhaustive omniscience, there must be a fixity to future contingencies. This requires that some might-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom also identify as would-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Simultaneously, Molinism also seeks to maintain indeterminism, which requires that some might-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom not identify as would-counterfactuals. After all, if all such possible contingencies would always occur, they would be necessary truths. So, Molinism requires within the set of all possible worlds a subset of infeasible worlds that God is incapable of actualizing. That’s where un-actualizeable contingencies that would never occur can be parked.

Entailments of Molinism:

Given S in C, Molinism entails that ~A might happen but never would happen. Moreover, Molinism entails that if p is true, then p exists in all feasible worlds – all worlds God is capable of actualizing. Conversely, p is false in some infeasible worlds (i.e., possible worlds God is incapable of actualizing). {Note: p needn’t be false in all infeasible worlds given that what makes some possible worlds infeasible worlds are future contingents other than p. In other words, ~p is sufficient for an infeasible world, but it is not necessary.}

Molinism entails that CCFs like p are contingent truths, which is to say, the freely chosen A that p contemplates is a future contingent. Given C, S would not necessarily freely A; though necessarily, S would always A in C if p is true.

Molinism has no claim on future contingents of creaturely freedom:

How is p not necessarily true given that God believes ~p is universally false within all possible worlds God is capable of actualizing? What is a true possibility that God cannot make truly actual, after all?

If a CCF like p is contingently true, then it follows that there is a possible world in which p is positively false or at least does not exist as true (depending on one’s take on the principle of bivalence). Given that Molinism allows for infeasible worlds within the set of all possible worlds, Molinists believe they have made room for the actual possibility of p being false (even if it is true that God is incapable of weakly actualizing ~A by strongly actualizing S in C). In other words, Molinism entails the actual possibility of future contingents that God cannot possibly actualize, (e.g, ~p). This invites the question, if God is incapable of actualizing a possible world because of an uncooperative future contingent such as ~p, then in what sense is such a future contingent a meaningful possibility? (Or, if God only believes p is false in infeasible worlds, then in what sense is p truly and possibly false?)

Molinist semantics and the logical-ontological or possible-actual chasm:

These creaturely dependent possibilities exist in the semantic land of possible-infeasible worlds. Therefore, Molinism entails some logical possibilities that are purely theoretical – so much so they are impossible for God to know as actualized realities, unless uninstantiated essences – the ultimate source of such true possibilities – make them so. So, Molinism entails true possibilities that can be actualized a whopping zero number of times, even though there are an “infinite number” of these possibilities. This is all the more striking when we consider the spontaneity of the pure contingency of libertarian freedom.

No matter how any world can be arranged, if it contains the actuality of the potential of what p abstractly contemplates, then <S freely As> always obtains as a concrete reality given the actualization of S in C. Accordingly, p as an abstract entity is true in all feasible worlds whether the concrete reality that p contemplates is actualized or not.

The irony of the quest for divine foreknowledge apart from determinism:

Now regarding logical necessity, if a particular truth exists in all possible worlds, it exists necessarily. Added to this, if something is logically necessary, then there is no possibility of it being other than what it is. This has little impact upon the Molinist position but only because within Molinism possibility is not necessarily God dependent. Molinism includes the claim that CCFs such as p are contingent truths because of a supposed logical possibility of p being false even though ~p is a sufficient condition for an infeasible world, a world which cannot become actual along with ~p! Therefore, for the Molinist some logical possibilities are admittedly impossible for God to actualize, yet those possible impossibilities are supposedly what prevents CCFs from becoming necessary truths. The potential for actualization of might-counterfactuals that are not also would-counterfactuals are supposedly real and creature dependent although God is incapable of actualizing the worlds in which they are true counterfactuals. They are abstract truths about possible realities that God cannot bring into actual existence, which would undermine their actual possibility, which in turn would make their negation (e.g., ~~p —> p) necessary truths. Therefore, the contingency of CCFs and exhaustive divine omniscience Molinism seeks on the basis of indeterminism ends in the brute fact necessity of all CCFs.

As intimidated here, a necessary truth is one that exists in every possible world. And although Molinism upholds a theory of possible worlds that affords room for contingent CCFs, if we maintain that necessary truths are truths that exist in every possible world that can possibly be actualized, then the truth values of CCFs in infeasible worlds are irrelevant in evaluating whether a counterfactual is a necessary truth. At the very least, could God believe such counterfactuals are possible?

Divine Causal Determinism saves future contingencies:

From an Augustinian perspective God freely determines what a person would freely do in any state of affairs. God is capable of actualizing a world in which I freely do not type this post under the same state of affairs in which I freely do type this post. Therefore, from an Augustinian perspective p is a contingent truth. Yet such future contingents are inconsistent with Molinism. The trajectory of Molinism leads to the untenable position that some logical possibilities are impossible for God to know as concrete, actualized realties. Accordingly, Molinism cannot bridge the logical-ontological / possible-actual chasm.