Tag: Faith

It has been argued by some Arminians (usually antinomians) and Calvinists (usually Clarkians) that we are justified by belief alone and that receiving and resting in Christ unpacks what it is to believe. In other words, receiving and resting in Christ is considered a figure of speech by which belief in Christ can be defined. It’s alleged that trusting in Christ alone does not complete justifying belief because trust is synonymous with belief. Therefore, to add receiving and resting in Christ to belief is either redundant or to add something additional to the instrumental cause of justification. The first deviation from the aberrant assent-alone view would be considered by those who hold to it a matter of muddled thinking, but the gospel would remain intact although jumbled. Whereas the second construct would undermine the grace by which we are saved, appropriated by belief alone.

Those who promote the belief alone view are sometimes met with tedious rejoinders such as the false dichotomy “we’re saved by Christ not propositional belief.” Notwithstanding, more serious objections have been raised against the belief alone position aimed at the group’s insistence upon reducing justifying faith to mere assent. This is where things get a bit nuanced.

Not all beliefs involve the will:

Most of the things we assent to, whether a priori or a posteriori, are not volitional. One does not will to believe that God exists any more than one wills to believe the rose is red. These are mental assents that are not discursive; they are immediate and without reflection. The will is bypassed.¹ However, the gospel always engages the will as the unbeliever counts the cost and by grace abandons all hope in himself while looking to Christ alone, finding rest in Him. Accordingly, it is inadequate to reduce justifying faith to belief alone when belief is reduced to intellectual assent without remainder.

Equivocal language confuses:

It is at this point some assert that assent is synonymous with trust in Christ. In this context it is opined that to assent to Christ dying on the cross for my sins is to trust the proposition is true. Albeit the premise is true, this observation turns on a subtle equivocation over the word trust. Indeed, to trust a proposition is true is no different than to assent to its truth. So, in that sense trust and assent are synonyms. However, to trust that something is true is not the same thing as to trust in that something. The latter idea of trust carries the meaning of reliance, whereas the former use of trust merely conveys an intellectual assent that might or might not be accompanied by the reliance sort of trust. Accordingly, to argue that trust and assent are synonymous is to deny the need to willfully trust in Christ alone for salvation.

As a last ditch effort some have argued that it is impossible to assent to the truth of the gospel without justification obtaining. They draw a distinction between (i) assent in non-spiritual matters (allowing for assent to obtain without trust) and (ii) assent with respect to the gospel (suggesting that assent is inseparable to trust, even its equivalent). They reason that true assent to the gospel is always accompanied by conversion. Therefore, assent entails trust because the two are inseparable where the gospel is concerned.

Even if assent were a sufficient condition for pardon in Christ, that would not mean that assent equates to trust any more than assent equates to regeneration. It would merely mean that when assent is present pardon obtains, just like when pardon obtains regeneration is present. Since when may a sufficient condition be equated with that which accompanies it?!

Intellection, volition and dispositions:

Assent pertains to accepting something as true, even possibly with no reflection, whereas trust (or lack of trust) pertains to the degree of relevance a person might assign to the “assented to” proposition. Assent is a mental act that need not be accompanied by volition; whereas trust in Christ is always volitional in nature. Assent always pertains to accepting the truth of a proposition, whereas how one might respond in light of assent (e.g. trust, rest, exuberance, etc.) is commonly classified under the philosophical heading of disposition, which is not propositional assent. Whereas trust and other dispositions can evidence assent, dispositions need not accompany any given assent since assents can be mundane, occur without reflection and, also, be subjectively perceived as inconsequential. (This is why philosophers consider disposition to be a poor indicator of the presence of assent. Dispositions are sufficient but not necessary for assent.)

Clarkians and easy-believism advocates promote that we are justified by belief alone. One is justified by assenting to “Jesus died for me.”

It seems to me that Clarkians redefine trust so that they might appear confessional since the Westminster standards clearly speak of not just “accepting“ the gospel as true but also relying upon (i.e. trusting in) the finished work of Christ.

It’s not just equivocal but also a downright case of special pleading to define “trust” as a synonym for assent and then limit the plea to spiritual matters as some Clarkians do. For some Clarkians, one can believe trains run on time without ever trusting oneself to the timeliness of a train. (Fair enough, though that’s a workaround to Clark’s views.) Yet they, also, maintain that one cannot intellectually assent to the gospel without savingly trusting in Christ because to assent to the gospel is to trust that the gospel is true. (Hence the equivocation and unjustified exception.)

Clarkians should outrightly deny trust rather than say they affirm it with respect to the gospel. The trust they equate with assent is not the trust of the Reformed tradition for that trust is metaphysical, volitional, and follows assent. It does not mean assent. It presupposes it!

Assents or beliefs are propositional attitudes that can be distinguished from volitional, metaphysical movements. For instance, choices are mental activities that engage both the intellect and the will. This is more recognizable once we consider that choices involve both judgment and reliance. What one deems as true can result in a choice to rely upon that which the judgment contemplates, but the intellection of belief need not give way to volition. This is sufficient to demonstrate that belief and volition are not the same things though they often go together. This observation would seem rather uncontroversial in the Reformed tradition. It was presupposed in Jonathan Edwards’ writings and was taken up by men like R.L. Dabney, A.A. Hodge and even William Cunningham. Yet contra the Reformed view, Gordon Clark believed that it is an illusion (an illusion, mind you!) to think that such acts of intellection differ from volition. Clark went so far as to say that belief in a chair is volitional!

Closing:

If assent and trust were synonyms, then either both would mean cognitive conviction or else volitional reliance. Conviction of truth (assent) could never give way to reliance upon truth (trust). If assent and trust are indistinguishable concepts and, therefore, mean the same thing, then it would be unintelligible to say that we rely upon anything we believe; nor would it be sensible to think that we believe anything we rely upon. Intellectual assent without reliance leaves no room for trusting in Christ; whereas reliance without conviction paves the way to trusting in Christ while not assenting to the gospel. Obviously, the concepts are indeed distinguishable as well as distinct principal acts of saving faith.

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_{¹ Even when the will is engaged in choosing, we don’t will belief. Doxastic Voluntarism is a philosophical surd.}