Philosophical Theology

Consider the proposition P: If agent S is presented with choice X in circumstance C, S will form intention Y.

While both Calvinists (compatibilists) and Molinists agree that given P, S will inevitably intend Y, they diverge sharply on the nature of that inevitability.

For the Calvinist, Y not only will occur but must occur. This is because God has determined both the logical and causal structures of P, so that S can do no other than form intention Y. In other words, God has decreed the causal link between the circumstance and the agent’s intention. Here, God exerts exhaustive control over both what S would do (counterfactuals) and what S will do (actualities). Finally, because God decrees P itself, he could decree a different outcome in relation to the exact same state of affairs.

In Molinism, God’s control is indirect. P is not something that is decreed, but something God knows through “Middle Knowledge.” Accordingly, God does not control what S would do because such truths are independent of God’s will. God only controls what S will do, and he does so by choosing to actualize the specific circumstance (C) in which he knows S will form intention Y. Consequently, while C is a sufficient condition for Y, S retains the libertarian power to do otherwise. This means that God does not determine the intention of the heart. Rather, God permits the known outcome to manifest. In this framework, God cannot decree a different outcome given the identical state of affairs, for the outcome is grounded solely in the agent’s own free agency.

Similarities:

Despite these structural differences, the subjective experience of the agent remains identical in both systems. S never feels coerced, nor does S disapprove of the intention. Whether the intention is causally determined (Calvinism) or sovereignly permitted (Molinism), S identifies with the choice and approves of it upon consummation.

Ultimately, both views treat P as a contingent truth in that P is neither necessary nor impossible. In other words, it’s theoretically possible that S chooses otherwise. 

Differences:

In Calvinism, the contingency of a free will choice is grounded in God’s sovereign ability to make P either true or false. Whereas in Molinism, P’s contingency is grounded solely in the agent’s autonomous freedom. In other words, in Calvinism God determines the truth value of P; whereas in Molinism, the uninstantiated essence anchors P’s truth value. 

The divergence between these two views fundamentally alters what creative options God has at his disposal. The central distinction lies in the concept of “Possible Worlds” versus “Feasible Worlds.”

Calvinism: All Possible Creative Options

In Calvinism, God’s creative options are limited only by the laws of logic. Because God determines the causal relationship between a circumstance (C) and an intention (Y), he can decree any logically possible outcome. In other words, all possibilities are truly available to God to actualize. Therefore, God can actualize any possible world just as long as he can conceive it. This follows from the compatibilist premise that what an agent would do is a decretive truth. Accordingly, God does not discover such truths but rather decides them for his own purposes. 

Molinism: Restricted Creative Options

In Molinism, God does not determine the free choices of men. Instead, God discovers what choices would be freely made through his eternal Middle Knowledge. They are the cards God must play if he desires to be in a personal relationship with his image bearers. Therefore, God’s creative options are limited not just by logic, but by the Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom (CCFs) – those truths about what free agents would do in certain situations, which God knows (passively).

Possible vs. Feasible:

Although there are infinite possible worlds, in a Molinistic framework only a subset of them are feasible for God to create. For example, it might be logically possible for S to form intention Y in circumstance C, but if it is a contingent truth that S would actually form intention Y, then a world where S chooses according to ~Y is “infeasible” for God to actualize.

Implications pertaining to prayer:

Calvinism: Because God can actualize any outcome, prayers are made with confidence that God was free to determine any answer that entails true possibilities. Accordingly, praying Christians can know that their prayers can be effectual, because God is pleased to incorporate prayer into the decree as a means to carry out his sovereign will.

Molinism: God’s creative options are limited by the free choices of agents. Therefore, in any given set of circumstances involving free will, God is limited to only one possible decreed outcome, restricting the scope of prayer for specific divine interventions. Sadly, prayer cannot be a means by which God effects change.

Implications pertaining to hope:

Molinism: God may convict a person to repent, but cannot cause one to repent, as that would deny human dignity and turn the agent into a puppet. This would render repentance to a non-free, mechanical act that is not praiseworthy.

In a crisis (e.g., a domestic dispute), hope is not placed in God’s transforming power, but in God applying enough pressure to make a person willing to change their own heart. Therefore, God is free to convict but not able to compel. This framework directs our hope away from God and toward the free and uninterrupted will of the one who needs change.

Calvinism: God’s absolute ability to transform rather than just his ability to persuade is a distinguishing feature of the Reformed tradition. While Molinism places the ultimate outcome in the uninterrupted free will of the agent, Calvinism shifts the believer’s hope entirely to God’s sovereign and effective grace. In a crisis like a domestic dispute, a Calvinist’s hope is not merely that God will apply pressure or conviction. Instead, it is believed that God delights in changing hearts, and takes pleasure in granting repentance.

Therefore, Calvinism offers pastoral comfort because God is never a passive onlooker who waits for one to change himself. Rather, Calvinism offers the hope that the outcome is never left to human agency alone. Even the most stubborn heart can be effectively reached by God’s operative grace. 

Implications pertaining to God:

Molinism creates a metaphysical conundrum by positing truths that are neither a reflection of God’s essence nor a a result of his decree. While Molinists liken these objects of middle knowledge to mathematical truths like 2+2=4, the comparison falls flat. Primitive / analytic truths are necessary because they’re grounded in God’s perfect rationality and nature. They cannot be different than what they are. In contrast, the objects of middle knowledge are contingently true, in that they could have been otherwise. The only similarity is that they’re pre-volitional and God may not change them. However, this creates a third thing alongside God that is not sourced in him, imposing external strictures that constrain divine freedom and sovereignty, which in turn violates Divine Simplicity by making the divine mind dependent on ungrounded, independent facts.

Because these contingent counterfactuals are not sourced in God’s essence or will, they take on a divine property of self-existence. Therefore, if Molinism were true, God’s mind would be eternally informed by a body of contingent truths that are not identical to His essence or a reflection of it. This would introduce a passive potency into the Trinity, a scenario in which God’s knowledge would depend on something external to himself. Such a philosophical structure would disrupt the unity of the Godhead by making God’s simple act of knowing dependent on a complex web of independent, ungrounded facts. God would not be pure act, but instead a recipient of knowledge.

Therefore, it follows that God’s Aseity would be violated if Molinism were true. This is because God would cease to be the sole, self-sufficient source of all reality. If God must consult truths he did not author or know according to his natural knowledge, much of his knowledge would be derivative rather than original. Instead of being the source of all existence, God becomes dependent on an external, self-existent body of facts to determine what he can create. In short, God becomes like us, which is the suppressed intention of all anti-Calvinistic thought.

Is libertarian freedom really necessary for moral accountability?

The frantic push for libertarian freedom to save moral accountability stems almost exclusively from a psychological fear of theological determinism, not from an inherent, intuitive lack in compatibilist freedom. In the final analysis, libertarian freedom cashes out as a frustrated, failed attempt to break the chain of divine determinism. It’s indubitable that it fails to show why acting according to one’s own intentions, even if those intentions are decreed by God, is insufficient for moral accountability.

There is nothing intuitively lacking in compatibilist freedom; it provides a robust framework for moral responsibility through the possession of cognitive capacities, the dispositional power to act on choices, and a sophisticated “mesh” of first and second-order desires. When an agent acts according to their own psychological approval and inherent desires, they are not a “puppet” but a genuine moral actor. In short, we don’t need libertarian freedom to make morally relevant choices. All we need is a will!

Ultimately, libertarianism is an attempt to break the chain of divine decree for reasons that do not impinge upon personal responsibility. Just as the biblical account of Saul’s death demonstrates – an ultimate sovereign cause (God) is perfectly compatible with a proximate human cause (the agent), leaving the agent fully responsible for the choices they truly desired to make.

Conclusion:

Molinism is a needlessly over-engineered attempt to shield God from His own sovereignty. By making divine decree dependent on human autonomy, its premise is as flawed as its implications. Molinism effectively destroys the efficacy of prayer, the security of hope, and the very aseity of God.