Why are these three points insufficient for human responsibility from an Arminian perspective?
Assume I were a Molinist asking the question!
- The possession of certain cognitive capacities that produce different acts given different states of affairs.
- Dispositional powers, which is to say the power to try to choose x rather than refrain from x or choose ~x.
- A “mesh” of first and second-order desires (desire to act and approval of desire to act) that are both intuitive and particular to choices in contradistinction to brute instincts, perhaps addiction and phobias too.
All three of those points are compatible with God’s eternal decree. Accordingly, how does a Reformed view of divine decree logically contradict moral accountability given that 1-3 would appear sufficient for moral accountability? To point to inability to do otherwise or the settledness of what a divine decree contemplates is a classic example of question begging. It’s merely to say compatibilist freedom is not libertarian freedom.
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