Philosophical Theology

On the Puritan Board, Keith Mathison had this to say. 

1. Van Til claimed that’s those among the Reformed who used traditional methods were compromising Reformed theology.
2. And since the traditional method was used by all of the Reformed theologians (with the possible exception of Calvin) for the 400 years prior to Van Til, they were all unwittingly compromising every major element of the Christian faith.
3. That is a serious claim because it means that all of the 16th and 17th century Reformed theologians had a compromised theology. That’s not good because those were the men who wrote our public confessions. The implication is that those confessions are also compromised to some degree.

(I’ve edited the original for ease of following the flow of reasoning.)

Keith Mathison argues thusly: 

Premise 1: Van Til believed that classical apologetics (CA) compromises Reformed theology (RT).

Premise 2: All Reformed theologians (with the possible exception of Calvin) employed CA methodology. 

Conclusion: Reformed confessions, because they were written by classical apologists, are compromised. 

Mathison’s argument doesn’t seem very persuasive to me.

Mathison’s use of “compromising” in the first instance pertains to Van Til’s belief that theologians compromise the truth of RT by employing CA. In other words, Van Til believed that CA was inconsistent with the theology it is intended to defend (when employed by Reformed theologians). In that sense, CA “compromises” (i.e., weakens, undermines, runs contrary to) the reasons for accepting RT as containing the true system of doctrine set-forth in Scripture. In other words, compromise in this sense is analogous to professing Christians, by not readily forgiving, compromising the gospel of forgiveness. In such instances as these, one’s practice opposes the truth one hopes to promote.

In its second use, it would appear that Mathison’s conclusion is that if Van Til is correct, then the theology of the Reformed confessions must itself be compromised theology because the confessions were penned by theologians who embraced the false theology implied by CA. (There’s no apparent allowance for inconsistency among classical apologists.)

In the first instance, it’s correctly purported that Van Til believed that CA implicitly fights against the truth of RT, whereas in the second instance it is concluded that if Van Til is correct, then Reformed confessional theology must itself be compromised theology: “The implication is that those confessions are also compromised to some degree.” (Mathison’s conclusion exceeds the scope of his premises.)

Of course, Mathison misses Van Til’s point, which is CA opposes the truth of RT and is consistent only with the false systems of Arminian and Roman Catholic theology, not Reformed theology. However, if all Mathison means to conclude is that Van Til’s position leads to the conclusion that CA is inconsistent with RT by running contrary to the truth of RT, then Mathison’s major premise is indistinguishable from his conclusion and he has argued in a very tight circle while offering nothing interesting or objectionable to Van Til’s point.

It’s striking to me that after James Anderson thoroughly interacted with J. V. Fesko’s Reforming Apologetics that the perceived misunderstandings and misrepresentations that Anderson believes he identified have not been addressed by Fesko. Unfortunately, the anti Van Til project has only picked up speed, as though Anderson offered no reason to pause. It’s all the more striking when one considers that Fesko is employed by the same Christian institution as Anderson. But aside from any such moral lament, perhaps the discussion might proceed by interacting with second and third generations of Van Til’s apologetic thought since we can’t seem to agree on Van Til. 

As an aside, should we think that Greg Bahnsen, and by extension those who followed in his footsteps, are putting forth a brand new apologetic that doesn’t reflect Van Til’s thought? If so, then who is the originator? 

In that vein of not debating Van Til, I offer this general reflection of Bahnsen Presuppositionalism* along with some moral criticisms of classical apologetics. 

*Perhaps Bahnsen left some questions unanswered, which I’ve tried to address more concretely, though I think the seed thoughts were there in his lectures and writings.