Philosophical Theology

The intended purpose of this latest installment is found in the title. Sometimes we just talk by each other; so I offer five clarifying points, followed by some similarities, differences and implications of two opposing systems of thought. I hope it’s useful. And as always, chew on the meat and spit out the bones.

1. Possible worlds are non-identical ways reality might have been. Consequently, no two possible worlds include all the same features. 

2. The precise number of possible worlds is the same for Calvinism and Molinism. We may not toy with any axiomatic rule of engagement that would create a mismatch between the two theological systems with respect to that precise number. 

3. In Calvinism but not Molinism, God can decree all realities that might have been. Consequently, although there are infinite possible worlds and that number is identical for Calvinism and Molinism, the ones God can actualize represents a “larger” infinity in Calvinism than Molinism. The reason for this is that only in Calvinism are the truth values of contingent free choices grounded in God’s sovereign determination; whereas in Molinism God passively, yet eternally, knows the truth values of all counterfactuals of creaturely freedom according to divine middle knowledge. Consequently, only in Calvinism can all possible worlds be actualized since Calvinism places no limits upon God’s freedom to decree all possible free choices. This is not true for Molinism. In Molinism, because God has no control over would-counterfactuals, the possible worlds God can decree are dramatically reduced in number.

4. Because in Molinism it is not possible for God to decree just any possible world (i.e., the infeasible ones), there is something artificial about including the decree as a feature of possible worlds. Calvinists sometimes do so in an effort to expose a weakness in Molinism but when Molinists take the bait they only participate in the reductio of their own position. Although both sides should agree that the decree is not a feature of possible worlds (which is addressed below), this ought not to curtail Calvinists from demonstrating why God’s decree on Molinist terms cannot, as a feature, be integrated into possible worlds lest Molinism ends up with less possible worlds than Calvinism! (See 5 below)

Molinists may observe that although it’s possible for John freely to refrain from choosing x in circumstance c, John never would. (John always freely chooses x in c.) John freely refraining from choosing x in c would be an instance of an infeasible possibility, yet a possibility just the same. However – and here’s the rub – although it’s possible for John to freely choose contrary to how he would, it’s not possible for God to actualize what John would never do. Stated differently, it is one thing for John to possibly choose an infeasibility, but in what sense is it possible that God decree a non-actualizeable infeasibility? Accordingly, it’s not only true that God would never decree a false counterfactual, it’s impossible for God to do so. The reason has to do with who is calling the shots in Molinism.

Although Molinism allows for John to choose otherwise according to libertarian freedom (and in doing so possibly change the truth value of the counterfactual of his creaturely freedom), God is not free to change the truth value of a would-counterfactual. To do so is an impossibility for God because he has no control over the truth values of such contingencies. In other words, the reason that it is possible for John to choose otherwise (and frustrate the decree, though he never would) is because John has regulative control as the ultimate source of his intentions. However, it is not possible for God to decree that John choose the otherwise possibility if John never would choose the otherwise possibility. And that’s because by Molinist strictures God does not determine counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.

In the final analysis, there is no possible decree in which John chooses otherwise even though there are possible worlds in which he does. In a word, if John’s choice is an infeasibility, then only within impossible worlds can God possibly decree it. It’s time to put that one to rest, unless, of course, we can identify a relevant distinction between (a) the possibility of God actualizing an infeasible world and (b) the possibility God’s act of doing so being a feature in a possible world.

5. Recall from 3 above, with Molinism there are fewer infinite possible worlds that can be actualized than with Calvinism. Consequently, given what is observed in 4 above, only by not including the creative decree as a feature of possible worlds we can maintain the same precise number of possible worlds from Calvinist and Molinist perspectives. Yet if we make the decree a feature of some possible worlds, then Calvinism will have more possible worlds than Molinism equal to the number of infeasible worlds in which the decree is included. That would seem to toy with the level ground that possible world semantics are to operate upon.

Similarities between the two systems: 

Assume as true, proposition p: If john were presented choice x in circumstance c, John would freely choose x. 

Given the truth of p, the sufficient condition of John being presented x in c makes the outcome of John freely choosing x necessary in some sense. The logical implication is that given p, the consequent logically follows in light of the antecedent. This merely means that the conditional relationship contemplated by p is logically implied by the if-then statement. This is not something to which a Molinist should object. 

Although there is a logical implication (or a necessity of the consequence), the proposition as a unit is itself not necessary. In other words, the logical entailment of p does not imply that if the antecedent is true, the consequent must follow. That’s because the causal relationship between the antecedent and consequent is not absolutely necessary. We need only to consider that it is intuitively possible that John not freely choose x in c. Indeed, there are possible worlds in which John does not freely choose x under relevantly similar circumstances to c. Therefore, when p is true, it’s nonetheless only contingently true because in some possible worlds p is false. In short, the logical relationship entailed by p does not of itself presuppose or imply a causal relationship. 

Dissimilarities between systems along with could implies possibility:

Although John could (possibly) freely choose not x in c, he won’t if p is true. 

For the Calvinist, it is possible that God actualize that John freely chooses not x in c because God could have determined a different outcome given a similar antecedent state of affairs. Whereas for the Molinist, although God cannot actualize a possible world in which John does not freely choose x in c given p, John has the ability to refrain from freely choosing x in c because he is indeterminately free. 

Introducing the decree:

Calvinism: John does not have the ability to do other than what has been decreed. If p is decreed, then God has determined that the antecedent circumstances will casually incline John’s intention to freely choose x in c. In a strictly logical sense, the decree of p guarantees the outcome and establishes God’s foreknowledge. In short, John’s free choice is casually secured by the antecedent circumstances, but only because God has pre-determined the causal relationship between the two. Although the relationship is only contingently true (not necessary or impossible), John cannot do otherwise given the decree, which contemplates a freely determined causal relationship that does not hinder the conditions for genuine compatibilist freedom. 

Molinism: When free moral agents act responsibly, they are indeterminately free. What this means is that there are no divinely determined causal relationships between circumstances and free choices. Yet this presents no limitation for God with respect to his ability to guarantee that the decree falls out in providence according to God’s exhaustive foreknowledge. 

God knows how John would choose virtue of his middle knowledge. Accordingly, God passively knows the relationship between circumstances and free choices, which he can then employ for his purposes. If God knows how John would freely choose under a set of circumstances, then all God has to do is strongly actualize those circumstances for John in order to weakly actualize John’s choice as a decreed result. (From a finite Calvinistic perspective, that can appear challenging given that the sufficient circumstances undoubtedly include free choices that can be otherwise!)

For the Molinist, although the antecedent circumstances sufficiently guarantee foreknown resultant choices, John retains the ability to choose other than how he would and what God knows. Notwithstanding, this does not imply that God can be wrong. In other words, in Molinism although it’s possible for John to go off script and frustrate the decree, John would never do so. Middle knowledge trumps libertarian freedom!

Sundry Implications:

1. In Reformed thought God could have decreed different possible free acts under identical circumstances, but man is unable to do other than what God has decreed. (Causal Divine Determinism)

2. For the Molinist, God was unable to decree different possible free acts under identical circumstances, but man is able to do contrary to what God has decreed, though he never would. (Agent Causation)

3. If God can actualize any possible outcome (as with Calvinism), then we can pray with confidence that God could have determined to answer any of our prayers that entail true possibilities. In other words, God was free to decree any possible outcome to be in response to our prayers.

4. Molinism, on the other hand, limits God’s creative options by acknowledging God’s inability to decree all possible outcomes for a specific set of circumstances that involve free agency. Accordingly, given any set of circumstances, God was able to decree only one possible free choice for which Christians might effectually pray! 

What’s lacking with a Calvinist view of freedom anyway? 

The impetus for libertarian freedom seems to be a fear of theological determinism. I say this because there’s nothing seemingly objectionable to compatibilist freedom. Why should one object to these general conditions for freedom? 

1. The possession of certain cognitive capacities that produce different acts given different states of affairs.
2. Dispositional powers, which is to say the power to try to choose x rather than refrain from x or choose ~x.
3. A “mesh” of first and second-order desires (desires to act and psychological approval of desires to act) that are both intuitive and particular to choices in contradistinction to brute instincts, perhaps addiction and phobias too.

All three of those points are compatible with theological determinism. We choose what we desire with a conscience that on some level approves. We aren’t puppets. Accordingly, how does a Reformed view of divine decree logically contradict moral accountability given that 1-3 would appear sufficient for moral accountability? To point to inability to do otherwise or the settledness of what a divine decree contemplates is a classic example of question begging. It’s merely to say compatibilist freedom is not incompatibilist freedom. That’s not very interesting. (No need to develop here the heretical implications of God’s knowledge that is neither free nor necessary.)

Introduce theological determinism into the mix and only then do Christians feel the need to scramble for something additional to save moral responsibility, but it’s not because compatibilist freedom is intuitively lacking. The idea of libertarian freedom is merely an attempt to break the chain of determinism for reasons that don’t impinge upon personal responsibility. After all, isn’t an ultimate cause compatible with a proximate cause? Who killed Saul, after all? (1 Chronicles 10:4,6,14)

Libertarian freedom does nothing to advance the cause of moral responsibility. In fact, such detached freedom would seem to abolish moral responsibility.