Keith Mathison’s views on Cornelius Van Til’s apologetic has been the topic of discussion on Reformed Forum (here, here and here).
Here is Mathison’s most recent and second response.
I will share just a couple comments about Mathison’s response and then provide links for further reflection.
Abbreviations:
Keith Mathison (KM)
Reformed Forum (RF)
Cornelius Van Til (CVT)
KM denies that he projects the “omniscience thesis” onto CVT. What this means is, KM denies that CVT believed that “man must know all about all things in order to know anything about anything.” Notwithstanding, RF impugns KM with projecting the thesis upon CVT (though KM denies doing so). Is RF correct? Does KM impugn CVT, perhaps even unwittingly, of holding to the omniscience thesis?
If anything is redundantly clear, KM desires to be understood as denying the omniscience thesis as it applies to CVT, and to be understood as merely saying that CVT believed that in order for man to have knowledge, there must be omniscience somewhere. Accordingly, we may reason further that for CVT, if God does not exist, then for any man to know anything, man himself must be omniscient. However, since no man is omniscient, atheism precludes the possibility of human knowledge. But quite aside from those reasonable implications, KM would like to underscore that CVT believed “humans don’t even need to be omniscient as long as God is.”
So, what might be RF’s disagreement? What sort of lockstep WTS grad would disagree with KM’s assessment of CVT? Or, does KM’s interpretation of CVT subtly (or not so subtly) imply elsewhere the omniscience thesis?
At the very least, it seems clear enough that KM strenuously denies RF’s interpretation of KM’s reading of CVT. But, of course, it’s not difficult to deny a position when we don’t recognize it as our own by implication. It’s called inconsistency, and we’re all susceptible in that noetic sense.
Here’s the rub:
KM asserts that CVT believed that fallen man cannot know things truly. But why is that? Well, as KM would have it, CVT believed that fallen man cannot know anything truly because he denies analogical knowledge:
“The issue is that he has rejected the only kind of human knowledge that can be considered true in any sense – namely (finite) analogical knowledge. Fallen man has to think analogically (not omnisciently) if he is to know anything.”
KM has confused the acknowledgment of thinking analogically with actually thinking analogically. The latter is unavoidable whereas the former is rarely done even by true believers. Accordingly, one implication of KM’s interpretation of CVT’s epistemology is that the epistemological justification for believing anything true must include a belief in analogical knowledge. (Let that sink in.)
After vehemently denying that the omniscience thesis applies to CVT, KM is explicit that for CVT: “God alone has exhaustive knowledge, and in the strictest sense, that exhaustive knowledge alone is ‘true” knowledge.” Now that surely goes beyond merely saying that omniscience must be “somewhere” for there to be the possibility of human knowledge. In other words, how is that not to impugn CVT with the omniscience thesis, which is: “man must know all about all things in order to know anything about anything.”
KM says: “[CVT’s] definition of true knowledge is not the same thing as the so-called omniscience thesis.” Yet KM also says this about CVT’s view of true knowledge: “God alone has exhaustive knowledge, and in the strictest sense, that exhaustive knowledge alone is ‘true’ knowledge.”
Closing;
KM believes that what permeates CVT’s thought is an unharnessed idealist epistemology. Accordingly, KM has an irreconcilable tension. Perhaps we may synthesize his view of CVT by saying that the Dutch continental (not analytic!) philosopher thought that unbelievers know things while not truly knowing things? If that’s KM’s view of CVT, then is there a problem with anyone exposing the latter claim until such time that it can be reconciled with the former claim? Yet if CVT’s epistemology is as utterly incoherent on this point as KM says, then why should KM object to the omniscience thesis if it’s true that idealism governed CVT’s philosophical mind to such an unhealthy extent?
Links of relevance:
Reflections on common notions and antithesis as they relate to this topic (along with other clarifications on presuppositionalism)
Apologetics methodology and moral considerations
Confusion over analogical knowledge (Clark / Van Til stuff for dummies.)
James Anderson addresses Davenant Institute on CVT
James Anderson interacts with Fesko on CVT
Philosophical Theology 