Philosophical Theology

Until the relevance of Old Testament (OT) civil law is clearly defined for the gospel age, theological and exegetical arguments will remain inconclusive. This article highlights a defining question, which is intended to force relevant theological and exegetical support for one of two distinct positions. 

There is an epistemic cost to the ‘no longer required’ position regarding OT civil law. It will be demonstrated that the opposing view to a distinctly Westminster civil ethic makes it impossible to know God’s mind on judicial equity relative to Israel’s understanding under covenantal rule. If the ‘no longer required’ view is correct, then God has either changed his mind on what constitutes judicial equity for the nations, or he never intended the OT civil law to illustrate abiding equity. By eliminating OT illustrations, either scenario makes it difficult to determine what God expects of civil magistrates today relative to the distant past. Furthermore, only one view aligns with the sufficiency of Scripture in equipping man for every good work, and only one avoids divorcing natural law from special revelation. At the very least, apart from relying on Scripture, it’s undeniable that rulers have a dismal track record of agreeing on what should constitute crime and determining suitable punishments (e.g., death, restitution, rehabilitation, warning etc.). 

Before diving into the argument, it is useful to review some basic logic and common forms of argument, allowing us to honor God more fully as his image bearers. 

The law of the excluded middle:

The law of the excluded middle (LEM) is a fundamental principle of classical logic that helps identify and examine disagreements over opposing views. The usefulness of LEM is that it enables opposing views to be reduced to a binary choice. Accordingly, LEM strips away the dross of middle ground, which helps clarify what is truly at stake between two sides.*

The application of LEM is straightforward enough: by removing the gray area via two contradictory options, proving one false automatically proves the other true. This principle is universal because a statement and its negation cannot both be true. Therefore, demonstrating that a negation leads to absurdity proves the original statement. This method, often referred to as an indirect proof (or proof by contradiction), is best illustrated with a concrete example. Hopefully it’s not one that is too personally familiar!

Assume you wanted to prove your innocence in a murder that required the murderer to be at the scene at the precise time of the crime (say, midnight ). 

LEM: Either you were at the crime scene at midnight or you were not. (There is no in-between.) 

Evidence: You were somewhere else at midnight. 

Fact: The murderer was at the scene at midnight. 

Result: You are not in the set of possible suspects. 

Takeaways from the argument:

The argument cuts through the noise and focuses the options on two. Things like motive, means, opportunity, emotional state, and preparation become moot if the alibi is indubitable. Of course, the evidence for being somewhere else can be challenged, and that is fine. Notwithstanding, the point of the illustration shows the clarifying usefulness of LEM.

The argument demonstrates the truth of innocence by showing that the only alternative (guilt) leads to an impossible situation (being at two places at once), which entails contradiction. (The basic argument employs a disjunctive syllogism that relies on identity and set theory.)

Finally, the argument is indirect rather than direct because it demonstrates where you were not (i.e, at the crime scene at midnight). The indirect aspect is perhaps clearer in the employment of modus tollens, which relies on a conditional premise rather than a disjunction. 

Assume the opposite of what you’d like to prove: 

1. You committed the murder at midnight. (Assumes the opposite)

2. If you committed the murder, then you must have been at the crime scene at midnight. (Conditional premise based on the assumption.)

3. You were not at the crime scene at midnight. (Contradiction)

4. It is false that you committed the murder. (Modus Tollens 2, 3 and 4)

5. You did not commit the murder. (Law of negation)

By combining these two arguments, we can create this robust defense:

1. LEM: Either you were at the crime scene at the precise time of murder (midnight) or you were not (i.e., it is false that you were). 

2. If you committed the murder, then you must have been at the crime scene at midnight. 

3. You were not at the crime scene at midnight.

4. It is false that you committed the murder.

5. Therefore, you did not commit the murder.

Applying tools of inference to OT civil ethics.

Premise: Either God requires all civil governments to apply the equity of OT civil law today, or he does not. (There is no third way!)

This requirement fails to account for the fact that many governments over the years have been ignorant of OT law through no fault of their own. Although natural law is universal, it is safe to assume that accountability to special revelation requires access to it.

Given the observation pertaining to culpability and ignorance, we can use the refined statement in our argument: 

1. Whenever possible (assumed hereafter), God requires civil governments to apply the general equity of OT civil law today, or he does not. 

2. If God does not require civil governments to apply the general equity of OT civil law today, then it’s impossible to know God’s mind on the subject. (The subject being concerned with determining crimes and just punishment.)

3. It’s not impossible to know God’s mind on the subject. 

4. It is false that God does not require that civil governments apply the general equity of OT civil law today.

5. Therefore, God requires civil governments to apply the general equity of OT civil law today.

Immediately we can notice that common assertions pertaining to (a) no theocracies today, (b) the civil law finding its fulfillment in excommunication and (c) the eschatological typology of the OT, all reduce to dross with respect to the argument. Those sorts of rejoinders, which have been dealt with elsewhere, may be used to bolster the “no longer required” position, but they fail to address the force of the present argument, which is an epistemological ultimatum. If we grant the “no longer required” position, then it should be acknowledged that “it’s impossible to know God’s mind on the subject.” Let’s just be up front about that one! (Again, “to know God’s mind on the subject” refers to being able to know which transgressions should be considered criminal acts along with the appropriate penal sanctions for those transgressions.)

Note: if it is true we may know God’s mind on the subject, then all other rejoinders are either false or are compatible with the Westminster civil ethic. If compatible, then all true rejoinders entail a false disjunction.

A few more clarifications before looking at further implications:

The second premise bears the weight of the argument. If civil governments can know God’s mind on the subject, which pertains to crimes and sanctions, then God’s revealed precepts are either suggestions that may be ignored or divine requirements. Assuming God doesn’t make suggestions, these precepts are either divine commands or else hidden from the nations in the mind of God.

After clarifying deontic distinctions between contrary and contradictory statements, we will explore epistemological options for discerning these precepts along with the practical implications of excluding Scripture from civil ethics.

Deontic logic (obligation, permission and prohibition):

If it is false that God requires the implementation of the general equity of OT civil law, then it is true that God does not require it. However, this does not imply that civil governments must not apply it, as some have reasoned especially regarding the first table of the law. It is critical to recognize that God’s requiring and his forbidding are contrary considerations, not contradictions. Therefore, it is possible that God neither strictly requires nor forbids a specific application (i.e., it is permissible). We should be mindful that the opposite of must is need not, and not must not. Therefore, if it is false that God requires X, we can only conclude that X is not necessary, absent further exegetical evidence.**

The usefulness of general revelation:

General revelation (GR) may be able to rank sins in a natural continuum of lesser to greater but it has limits. Only special revelation can clearly distinguish between a sin and a legal crime or set specific, divine penalties for a fallen world. For if GR could do all that, then it would identify too closely with the OT civil law, which would then oblige nations to their use! Yet such divine obligation contradicts the principle of the indifference of permission, leading to a double-bind.

Assuming the opposite:

We will assume that the Westminster civil ethic is false, which would mean that God does not require the general equity of the civil code to be applied in contemporary contexts. Such an assumption leads to the following conditional statement: 

If God does not require the Westminster civil ethic today, then either he prohibits or permits it.

Examining the two remaining options: 

Prohibition: 

A total prohibition on OT civil law for today creates a logical inconsistency: we may not forbid the civil code in toto while simultaneously arguing for some penal sanctions that mimic OT law. That is the fallacy of special pleading. A no-law position is unsustainable because it forces arbitrary choices on which “OT-like” laws to keep, or it improperly handcuffs civil magistrates to avoid anything that resembles OT law. A more nuanced approach is needed. (Note: This assumes we are not appealing to a “no-scriptural-appeal-allowed” argument, which allows for OT laws just as long as they’re not justified with Scripture.)

Permission:

If there is no Scriptural obligation to implement the general equity of the OT civil code, yet we assume that God has beliefs on how civil magistrates should operate, then God has either hidden his mind on the matter by providing no revelation at all, or else he has relegated the nations to GR along with the moral freedom to implement Scripture or not. 

Two forked paths off the single road of permission:

Permission with hidden will:

If God has entirely concealed his mind regarding civil justice, then the common grace of GR would be functionally useless. We would expect a legal landscape of pure chaos, one in which minor traffic infractions carry the death penalty while violent crimes receive mere fines. Since even a basic observation of human society proves that God has not withdrawn common grace and utterly hidden his standard of justice, we are forced to weigh the sufficiency of GR against our own prudential judgment of Scripture’s role in the state.

Permission with divine guidance:

Because GR is immutable, it cannot forbid the application of Israel’s civil code for today, lest we conclude that OT Israel lived in irreconcilable tension and that God authored confusion while both forms of revelation were operative. Accordingly, there is no inherent conflict between OT civil law and GR. 

However, although GR does not forbid OT civil law today, we may not infer that it perfectly mirrors it, as this leads to contradiction. As alluded to earlier, if GR exactly mirrored OT law, making the equity of OT laws optional would necessitate making GR optional on those same points.

Ultimately, we face a double-bind: if GR binds us while reflecting OT civil law, then OT civil law cannot be optional. Conversely, if OT civil law is optional today, then GR cannot be construed as its exact reflection. This dilemma highlights the intended complementary, rather than identical nature, of these revelations.

This in invites the question of how useful is GR for governing societies.

Although GR is binding it cannot forbid the general equity of OT civil law due to the problem of revelatory contradiction; nor can it mirror it due to the double-bind conundrum. Consequently, GR and OT civil law move in the same direction but they are not identical shapes. 

Before closing with some questions for further reflection, it might be useful to review the argument:

1. Whenever possible, God requires all civil governments to apply the general equity of OT civil law today, or he does not. 

2. If God does not require all civil governments to apply the general equity of OT civil law today, then it’s impossible to know God’s mind on the subject. (The subject being concerned with determining crimes and punishment.)

3. It’s not impossible to know God’s mind on the subject. 

4. It is false that God does not require that all civil governments apply the general equity of OT civil law today.

5. Therefore, God requires all civil governments to apply the general equity of OT civil law today.

Questions for further reflection:

Where in Scripture does God release civil governments from the equity of what God once considered just, limiting our knowledge in this area of ethics?

Exegetically, what does the whole counsel of God teach about the normativity of judicial equity since the cross, and equipping the nations for this good work?

How might one justify which sins should be considered crimes, and what suitable punishments should be meted out given that GR eternally condemns the least of all transgressions?

If it is impossible to know God’s mind on the subject (sins vs crimes), then does God have no beliefs or has he hidden his beliefs?

If God has beliefs on this subject, why has he hidden them since the cross?

A final plea:

Hopefully this framing of the issue makes evasion more difficult and honest engagement more likely. Either we can know which civil laws and penal sanctions please God, or it is false that we can know. If it’s false that we can know, then we’re just swapping opinions.

And now, O Israel, listen to the statutes and the rules that I am teaching you, and do them, that you may live, and go in and take possession of the land that the LORD, the God of your fathers, is giving you. You shall not add to the word that I command you, nor take from it, that you may keep the commandments of the LORD your God that I command you. Your eyes have seen what the LORD did at Baal-peor, for the LORD your God destroyed from among you all the men who followed the Baal of Peor. But you who held fast to the LORD your God are all alive today. See, I have taught you statutes and rules, as the LORD my God commanded me, that you should do them in the land that you are entering to take possession of it. Keep them and do them, for that will be your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the peoples, who, when they hear all these statutes, will say, ‘Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people.’ For what great nation is there that has a god so near to it as the LORD our God is to us, whenever we call upon him? And what great nation is there, that has statutes and rules so righteous as all this law that I set before you today? Deuteronomy 4:1-8

* Some like to point to the “gray areas” of life, and in doing so recoil against the use of logic in such instances. Although there are gray areas in life, it doesn’t necessarily follow that LEM cannot apply to situations that are apparently gray. For instance, whether a person is tall or not is an apparent gray area. Yet if we define tall as 5’ 11”, we now have a binary consideration. The key is to identify vague qualitative predicates and turn them into precise quantitative boundaries. For instance, “is this house too expensive for us?” Well, no husband and wife can answer that question until a numerical threshold is determined. Once that is determined, it’s a snap to create a proposition that is true or false according to the determined threshold. In the present context, both sides of the issue should agree that either God requires all civil governments to apply the equity of OT civil law today, or he does not. (There is no gray area on that question.)

** If the opposite of must is need not, then those two sets must exhaust the two possibilities. This invites the question: which set includes must not? Well, obviously it can’t fall under must, for those two instructions are obviously on a collision course. But still, how is must not a subset of need not? Doesn’t that seem odd given that need not implies permission, whereas must not does not allow permission. Accordingly, what is their common feature that makes one a subset of the other? The reason this might seem odd is because we usually focus on what terms allow, but logic defines terms in what they exclude. The common ground they share is the absence of obligation:

Need not = It is not the case that you are required to do X.

Must not = You are required not to do X.

Therefore, the two share the absence of obligation that must contemplates. 

Lastly, why is must not the subset as opposed to need not being the subset? 

In deontic logic “must not” is a stronger claim than need not, making must not a subset of the umbrella claim of need not. The reason this is true is that if you must not do X is true, then necessarily you need not do X is also true. However, the reverse is not true: “If you need not do X, then necessarily you must not do X” is false.