Philosophical Theology

A Non-Rationalistic Rational Theology

What drives libertarian freedom, moral responsibility or determinism?

What seems to drive Libertarians to their view of freedom is not the reasonableness of pure contingency. It’s seems intuitive that compatibilist freedom provides the sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. I don’t think many libertarians would have looked any further than to those conditions if determinism wasn’t part of the discussion.

In other words, if we merely summarize the essence of freedom as the possession of certain cognitive capacities that produce different willed acts given different states of affairs, who’d object? Such freedom would seem to entail moral responsibility. Now introduce determinism, and then people feel the need to scramble for something additional to save moral responsibility, but it’s not because compatibilist freedom is intuitively lacking. The idea of libertarian freedom is merely an attempt to break the chain of determinism for reasons that don’t impinge upon personal responsibility! After all, isn’t an ultimate cause compatible with a proximate cause? Who killed Saul? (1 Chronicles 10:4,6,14)

Libertarian freedom does nothing to advance the cause of moral responsibility. In fact, such detached freedom would seem to abolish moral responsibility.

,
,
Ron DiGiacomo's avatar

Posted by:

Ron DiGiacomo

4 responses to “What drives libertarian freedom, moral responsibility or determinism?”

  1. Libertarian free will, regress or crickets? – Philosophical Theology Avatar
    Libertarian free will, regress or crickets? – Philosophical Theology

    […] For a simple explanation of why incompatibilist-libertarians might subscribe to the philosophical surd of libertarian freedom rather than to the sufficient conditions for moral responsibility that compatibilism has to offer, try here. […]

    Like

  2. From whence come intentions, and how is compatibilism any better in this regard? – Philosophical Theology Avatar
    From whence come intentions, and how is compatibilism any better in this regard? – Philosophical Theology

    […] Plain and simple, we are responsible for what we believe and what we intend because they are our beliefs and our intentions. I maintain that it’s not the freedom of compatibilist freedom that’s so objectionable to libertarians, but rathe… […]

    Like

  3. Compatibilist Freedom and Properly Basic Beliefs, an analogy of unlikely bedfellows – Philosophical Theology Avatar
    Compatibilist Freedom and Properly Basic Beliefs, an analogy of unlikely bedfellows – Philosophical Theology

    […] for what we believe and what we intend because they are our beliefs and our intentions. I maintain that it’s not the freedom of compatibilist freedom that’s so objectionable to libertarians, but […]

    Like

  4. Moving beyond Sproulian Compatibilism – Philosophical Theology Avatar
    Moving beyond Sproulian Compatibilism – Philosophical Theology

    […] What is lacking with compatibilist freedom as it relates to responsibility that supposedly makes libertarian freedom necessary? Is agent causation ill defined or even defensible? Food for thought, I […]

    Like