Philosophical Theology

The following quote is taken from a review of the book John Davenant’s Hypothetical Universalism: A Defense of Catholic and Reformed Orthodoxy.

The reviewer attributes the quote to the author of the book.

Broadly considered, we understand early modern hypothetical universalism to teach (1) that Christ died for all human beings in order to merit by his death the possibility of the redemption of all human beings on condition of their faith and repentance. All human beings, on account of the death of Christ, are redeemable or savable—that is, able to have their sins remitted according to divine justice. Further, (2) early modern hypothetical universalism affirmed that God, by means of the death of Christ, purchased, merited, or impetrated all the to-be-applied saving graces for the elect, and for the elect alone. Christ died for the apostle Peter in a way he did not die for Judas.

Page 15, emphasis mine

Hypothetical universalism (HU) implies that,

p1: Christ’s death secured the possibility of salvation for all human beings

and 

p2: Christ’s death secured the surety of salvation for the elect alone.

An entailment of HU is that it is truly possible for the non-elect to be saved.

A few words about possibility: 

In a colloquial sense we might say, “It is possible that Parker will accept an offer to come for lunch.” In such instances we don’t know whether Parker will accept such an offer, for in our finitude we don’t know the actual outcome of any such offer. Therefore, at least in a non-technical sense may we say that it is possible that Parker accepts an offer for lunch.

Similarly, we might say, “It is possible that Warby will receive Christ and be saved.” In an informal sense, we would deem it possible that Warby becomes a believer because from our finite perspective, there is nothing we know that necessarily precludes Warby’s salvation. For all we know, Warby would savingly believe if offered Christ in the gospel. Surely, there are possible worlds God can bring into existence or “actualize” in which Warby freely believes and is saved.

The question and requisite tools for answering:

The question before us is whether the Reformed doctrine of election precludes the possibility of salvation for the non-elect. If it does, then HU is false doctrine given the Reformed doctrine of election.

Before proceeding, it might be good to begin with some initial spadework regarding (a) logical and metaphysical possibility, (b) possible world semantics, and (c) the relevant implications of divine foreknowledge.

The logic of possibility:

In logic, possibility entails the absence of contradiction. In the realm of what is called strict or narrow sense logic, logical possibility (as opposed to metaphysical possibility) is concerned more with words and symbols than definitions. So, for instance, it is a narrowly logical possibility that,

p3: God does not exhaustively know the future.

Whereas it is logically impossible that,

p4: God does not know the future while simultaneously (and in the same way) knowing the future.

The reason p3 is logically possible in this esoteric sense is because without an orthodox definition of God informing us about God, there is nothing in the formulation of the words that denotes logical contradiction.

Whereas even without an orthodox definition of God informing us, p4 entails an inferable logical contradiction because it violates the law of non-contradiction by asserting in contradictory form that God both knows the future and does not know the future. Unlike with p3, p4 takes a form of x and ~x being true at the same time etc.

Now, of course, we know that God is exhaustively omniscient. We, also, know that it is impossible that God not know the future. Although it may be said in an esoterically logical sense that God does not know the future, we know that God would not be God if he did not know the future! In other words, it would be impossible in a more meaningful sense for God not to know the future. The impossibility in view is a metaphysical consideration that takes into account God as God.

So, it is a broadly logical impossibility that God is not omniscient. With additional meaning in place, we may properly maintain that it is a metaphysical impossibility that God does not know the future exhaustively. Furthermore, this is abstractly demonstrable when we consider that there is no actualizable world in which God does not know the future. These two concepts are correlative: (a) the impossibility of God not knowing the future and (b) the impossibility of an actualized world in which (a) is false. In other words, the impossibility of a less than omniscient God and an actualized world that contemplates such a being entail reciprocal implications.

What does this have to do with HU?

There are possible worlds in which Adam would not fall and Judas would not deny the Lord for thirty pieces of silver. In any such world, God would believe that Adam would resist temptation and Judas would not sell out the Lord for thirty pieces of silver. Conversely, there is no possible world of which God lacks belief about what Adam and Judas would do. The feature of such an impossible world that makes them such is the entailment of the metaphysical impossibility of God having either a false belief or non-belief about any counterfactual event. (This polemic deals from a Reformed perspective on possibility, which denies Molinism’s possible-infeasibilities. In short, it assumes Calvinism in order to evaluate whether HU is Reformed.)

Recall again, HU entailments:

p1: Christ’s death secured the possibility of salvation for all human beings

and 

p2: Christ’s death secured the surety of salvation for the elect alone.

Those two propositions do not rule out the possibility of actual universalism (i.e., other possible worlds in which all are elect and will be saved). That the work of the cross has in this world saved everyone (universalism) is contingently false because it is neither impossible nor necessary yet nonetheless false. To avoid universalism, we may add something like p*, which does not undermine the intent of HU for the Reformed who affirm the basis for divine exhaustive omniscience.

p*: If God is exhaustively omniscient and all human beings are not elect in this actual world (PWa), yet some are, then God believes that at least one particular human being will not be saved.

HU is false:

Given p* and p2, p1 is false because it entails an impossible consequence (a contradiction) that all can be saved when all are not believed by God to be elect and consequently will not be caused by God to receive the grace of faith. (In other words, p1 is false because it is contradictory that all can be saved when it is false that all can believe.)

Additionally, if p1 is false, then HU is false since p1 is essential to HU.

Why is p1 false?

Again, p1: Christ’s death secured the possibility of salvation for all human beings.

What does it mean that “Christ’s death secured the possibility of salvation for all human beings”, including human beings who are not elected unto caused faith? From Reformed perspective, this would mean that non-elect persons could be elect persons!

Can God actualize a world wherein God believes something false or has non-belief about a future event? If not, then such worlds, which include God’s beliefs, are broadly illogical and metaphysically impossible. Therefore, statistically speaking, assume the set of infinite possible worlds of which God believes that within each of those worlds one or more human beings are not elect. In zero of those worlds would the salvation of a all persons ever obtain!

Now then, what is the probability of an outcome that would have zero occurrences given an infinite number of trials? Well, zero, of course.* Yet if there is zero probability of a non-elect person becoming saved in this particular set of possible worlds, then how is it meaningfully “possible” for any such person to become saved? (The Molinist claim that such a person could be saved though never would be saved is addressed here.)

If the salvation of the non-elect is not metaphysically possible in a statistical sense, then HU’s most essential feature (p1) is false, making the theory of HU false. Directly stated, from a Reformed perspective it is not possible that a non-elect person believes and becomes saved any more than it is possible that a non-elect person becomes elect. HU fails the coherence test. From a Reformed perspective God would have to cause one to believe against God’s own decretive will! If God believes in the possibility of the salvation of the non-elect while simultaneously believing it is impossible that a non-elect person would ever be saved in n trials, then how does God avoid believing that salvation is possible and not possible in the same way, which is not just metaphysically impossible for God but also would require God to be logically incoherent? Yet if God does not believe in the salvation of the non-elect, then there is no possibility of their salvation given God’s disbelief since God believes all truth, and in Reformed thought contingent truths about creaturely freedom become causally necessary, having been determined.

*Events that are impossible have zero probability of occurrence, which should not be confused with zero probability events that are not necessarily impossible occurrences. Impossibility is sufficient for zero probability but the reverse is not necessarily true. Consider a dart board with an infinite number of points with the precise circumference of the point of a dart. The probability of a thrown dart piercing a particular point on the board is 1 over infinity. However, the dart will hit some particular point on the dart board. So, it is possible an event occurs that has zero probability of occurring. This is not the case with impossible events, although they too have zero probability of occurring.