Philosophical Theology

After writing this article, a number of questions came my way from committed Calvinists. This brief installment is a result of some of those correspondences.

Molinism affords a strong view of divine providence along with a principle of free will such that if Luis freely chooses the chili dog at the carnival, then it is possible that he not choose the chili dog at the carnival. In other words, it’s possible that what would freely occur could not occur – even after the decree that makes it true that it will occur. And although Luis is free in a libertarian sense, God no less foreordains Luis’ free choice.

Because for the Molinist God knows what Luis would freely choose under all sets of circumstances, by sovereign decree God can weakly actualize Luis’ free choice of the chili dog by strongly actualizing conducive circumstances over which God has control. So, without causing Luis to choose the chili dog at the carnival, God can guarantee Luis’ free choice by ensuring sufficient circumstances obtain. Luis would end up freely choosing the outcome that God foreordains.

For the Molinist God’s decree takes into account his prior knowledge of what Luis would freely choose if at the carnival and presented a chili dog. Given the decree, God now knows what Luis will freely choose because God already knew what Luis would freely choose in all possible circumstances that God could orchestrate. Therefore, God knows what Luis will freely choose because God knows which possible world he has decreed and all the features therein. Those features include each would-counterfactual that God decreed to bring to pass by strongly actualizing the conditions that would result in the weak actualization of the free choice counterfactuals.

Observations:

1. Because Molinism denies theological determinism and compatibilist freedom, the possibility of Luis not freely choosing the chili dog at the carnival (under identical relevant circumstances) is not a possibility God can actualize. The reason being, in Molinism God cannot determine a free choice if it is to remain free. Because Luis and not God is the ultimate controlling source of Luis’ free choice, an entailment of Molinism is that only a subset of possible worlds can be actualized. (These actualizable worlds Molinists call feasible worlds.)

2. Molinists and theological determinists believe God knows all possibilities by his natural knowledge, and that God’s decree is naturally constrained by possibilities. (It shouldn’t be controversial that God cannot decree an impossibility!) Both schools also believe that God’s knowledge of what will occur is based upon his decree. For the Molinist God’s knows the future free acts of responsible and free moral agents not because he foresaw or determined the acts but because he decreed their outcome after consulting his middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs).

3. For the Molinist God does not determine by decree what Luis would freely choose under all circumstances. Instead, God pre-volitionally, passively and eternally possesses such counterfactual knowledge. Therefore, in Molinism God’s knowledge of CCFs is prior to the decree and after his knowledge of all possibilities. (Hence God’s middle knowledge.)

4. In Reformed thought CCFs are causally secured and implied by exhaustive foreknowledge. In other words, God freely and positively determines what Luis would freely choose if presented a chili dog at the carnival. Without God predetermining the causal relationship between circumstances and free choices, free choices could not be foreknown.

In closing:

In the final analysis, the source of God’s knowledge of CCFs is inexorably tied to the kind of freedom man has, whether it is libertarian or compatibilist freedom. The subtle yet significant difference between Molinism and Theological Determinism lies chiefly in how God knows what would freely occur under all possible circumstances. The objects of such knowledge either influence the decree (middle knowledge) or are part of the decree (free knowledge). God’s knowledge of CCFs either is sourced from uninstantiated human essences, or God looks only to his independent determinative counsel for such knowledge. Either God is a dependent being or he is not.