Philosophical Theology

Why Add My Voice To this Watershed Issue?

I cannot remain on the sidelines of this debate because the stakes for how we understand our Savior are simply too high. If Dr. Garner is correct, then Christ’s eternal, natural sonship is insufficient for our salvation without a historical, messianic adoption; if his critics are correct, this novel framework implies that Jesus Christ, in the days of his humiliation, related to the Father as a son only according to his divinity, but that the same person could not relate to the Father as a son according to his humanity because adoption was not yet attained. Because this debate threatens to redraw the very boundaries of confessional orthodoxy, it demands our careful attention.

The Recent Context:

This month, Drs. Robert Letham and Lane Tipton wrote critical essays against Dr. David Garner’s adoption thesis. Dr. Garner responded to those essays.

Just prior to Drs. Letham and Tipton publishing their pieces, I voiced my own disagreement with the adoption thesis.

This latest installment of mine interacts with portions of Dr. Garner’s response to Drs. Letham and Tipton. (I remain no less critical of the adoption thesis.)

(6/26/2026: Drs. Letham’s and Tipton’s surrejoinders to Dr. Garner are now published.)

Before delving into my interaction with Dr. Garner’s response, it would be helpful to read a short section from my previous piece. In two sentences I summarize the adoption thesis, then put up some fence posts for more effective interaction. I reprint these portions immediately below, set off by the date of publication.

4/21/2026

At the heart of the adoption thesis is that Christ is the adopted Son par excellence. His resurrection was his official “adoption” into his glorified office, which makes our salvation and adoption possible.

Some Initial Ground Rules:

In the Incarnation, the eternal Son of God assumed a complete human nature, becoming what he was not without ceasing to be who he was. This union of two distinct natures within a single hypostasis does not create a second subject; rather, the Son remains the sole acting agent, his divine essence eternally consubstantial with the Father. Guided by the Spirit, the Church confesses that this union exists without confusion, change, division, or separation. Therefore, while the predicate “man” accurately describes the Son in his mediatory office, it does not necessarily imply change to his immutable divine substance.

Similarly, Christ was not publicly justified until his resurrection. That is to say, this new status of vindication before the world was not possessed during Christ’s state of humiliation. Accordingly, we may rightly say Christ “attained” justification, yet without implying a second person or a change in his divine nature. This demonstrates that attaining a new status, in and of itself, does not necessarily drift into heterodoxy but rather, in this case, accurately reflects the transition from humiliation to exaltation.

Applying These Distinctions:

Because the incarnation was a free and contingent act of God (i.e., it was neither necessary nor impossible), and Christ was vindicated in his humanity, any charge against the adoption thesis that is based solely upon contingency or attaining a new status will be difficult. If so, then any successful refutation of the adoption thesis must argue within these theological fence posts. To ignore them in an attempt to defeat the thesis is to undermine the possibility of the incarnation and Christ’s vindication in the Spirit.

Confessional Orthodoxy Does Not Preclude Implicit Heterodoxy:

Just as critics of the adoption thesis cannot rely solely on arguments about historical contingency, its supporters cannot defend themselves simply by affirming the Council of Chalcedon. The core issue is not whether proponents explicitly accept Chalcedonian Christology, but whether the logical implications of their adoption thesis actually undermine it. We must ask whether the claim of Christ’s adoption destroys Chalcedonian orthodoxy in a way that the incarnation and resurrection do not. I believe it does.

End of 4/21/2026

All quotes below are Dr. Garner’s, with the exception of one, which is attributed to Thomas Aquinas. Unless otherwise marked, Dr. Garner’s quotes are from his June response to the two distinguished scholars.

From page 203 of Dr Garner’s Book, SONS in the SON:

“Jesus’ newly attained Sonship marks the satisfaction of the Father…”

“…the messianic Son became the resurrected/adopted Son…”

“Without the improvement of the Son onto eschatological eschatological-adoptive sonship, his life lacks soteriological efficacy!”

For Dr. Garner, God is satisfied by Christ becoming the adopted Son. This “improvement” lends efficacy to our salvation. Indeed, if Christ isn’t adopted, we cannot be saved (per the adoption thesis). This deserves more attention given the extraordinary claim. So, before getting into Dr. Garner’s responses to Drs. Letham and Tipton, I will make one comment regarding the quotes above from Sons in the Son.

According to the doctrine of the hypostatic union, Christ’s two natures do not act independently; rather, the single divine Person always acts. To maintain that Christ is one person, orthodoxy entails that the eternal Son of God is the sole subject of every divine and human action. Because a person acts according to a nature, when Jesus experienced human limitations, such as thirst, sleep, or grief, it was always the one divine person of the Son experiencing these according to his assumed human nature.

This orthodoxy is strained under the adoption thesis. By asserting that Christ was not a son in human existence at the moment of the incarnation, the adoption thesis creates an artificial, metaphysical rift. It implies that the divine Person related to the Father as a son only according to his divinity, but that the same person could not relate to the Father as a son according to his humanity (for human adoption was not yet attained). Consequently, the adoption thesis artificially isolates Christ’s assumed human nature from his divine personhood, essentially treating his humanity as a detached instrument rather than a fully integrated, assumed human nature in one hypostasis. It is as though Christ’s humanity needed to catch up in the resurrection, resulting in an eschatological “improvement” unto two distinct modes of sonship, one divine and natural, and one human and adopted.

With that concern aside for the moment, we can now turn our attention toward Dr. Garner’s interaction with his peers. (At the close, I will expand on the metaphysical difficulties and raise mediatory ones as well.)

Dr. Garner’s Responses:

The following quotes are directed from Dr. Garner to Dr. Letham. Afterward, we will examine a few quotes directed at Dr. Tipton.

“The crux now concerns whether or not the resurrection of Christ can or should, in any sense, be considered his adoption, particularly in light of Romans 1:3–4”

A declaration of status, in this case the status of Son, does not imply its prior absence. After all, the declaration of the believers’ justification on the Last Day will serve to vindicate the righteousness they already had in Christ, rather than creating it anew; it is a republication of the believer’s prior status. Similarly, Christ’s resurrection should be seen as an epistemic vindication and demonstration, not an ontological creation. Out from the resurrection, Christ was demonstrated with power as the Son of God, which in no way demands he became the Son at the resurrection. Rather, the eternal Son became the God-man Son (without need of “improvement”) at the incarnation. To argue otherwise is a clear case of eisegetical proof-texting.

Consider Matthew 3:17, where a voice from heaven declares at Jesus’ baptism: “This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.” Are we to infer that Jesus failed to please his Father prior to this moment of declaration, or that he became the Son through baptism? The same applies to the Transfiguration in Matthew 17. Therefore, if consistency demands the adoption thesis for Romans 1, then this same methodology forces one to accept multiple adoptions of Christ. We can further note by the same hermeneutical principle of “the analogy of faith” that Jesus was both Lord and Christ prior to the resurrection; yet in Acts 2:36, Peter declares those designations according to Christ’s resurrection and ascension to God’s right hand (in fulfillment of the Davidic covenant). Accordingly, the pronouncement pertains not to becoming Lord but being bodily enthroned as such!

The primary alternative is to invoke speech act theory, arguing that this declaration dynamically “brings about” Christ’s Sonship. This, too, is an unwarranted assumption derived outside the text. Romans 1 requires neither a declaration of new sonship nor a performative mechanism that transforms the natural Son into an adopted one. It is simply a demonstrative pronouncement openly confirming Christ’s eternal Sonship, which grounds his incarnation. In short, Christ, the singular Subject, is the eternal Son of God, both in his humiliation and his exaltation, which presents no possibility of adoption.

Whether God is verbally introducing to the world Christ as his Son (Baptism and Transfiguration), or declaring Christ’s vindication and enthronement in power (Resurrection and Pentecost), there is no binary transaction of Christ becoming a Son he wasn’t before. It’s just not there.

“Yet if the gift in redemption is Christ himself, he cannot give what he does not possess; he does not yield what he does not attain.” 

Dr. Garner applies this principle to a completely new area, the doctrine of adoption. He argues that believers can only be adopted by God because Jesus himself went through a process of messianic adoption and vindication in his resurrection. Dr. Garner is certain there is no salvation apart from Christ being adopted in his resurrection. The traditional application of the axiom Dr. Garner draws upon was primarily used to affirm Christ’s full divinity, that he must himself possess what he bestows upon us (2 Peter 1:4). An integrally related patristic principle (“what is not assumed is not redeemed”) addressed the incarnation, teaching that Christ assumed a complete human nature, not just a human body but also a rational soul, so that humans could be fully redeemable. It is crucial to maintain these two patristic principles by distinguishing nature (what we are) from status (how we relate to God).

These two ancient church principles stand together and share the same logic, namely, Christ cannot give what he does not have, and he cannot save what he did not become. These ideas match perfectly and cannot be put asunder because both are about Christ’s actual being. The first ensures he is fully divine to save us, and the second ensures he is fully human to represent us. Therefore, we can legitimately test Dr. Garner’s adoption thesis by interacting with the first principle’s patristic twin, which is equally inconvenient for the adoption thesis.

In the incarnation, Christ assumed a human body and soul. Whereas the body is redeemed unto future resurrection and glorification, the soul is redeemed unto regeneration, sanctification, and eventual perfection. In short, humans are redeemed in their two essential and constitutive parts, as body-soul composites. In this sense, redemption tracks the hypostatic union.

Adoption, by contrast, is not an essential property of human nature. Accordingly, it’s not redeemable in any sense. Adoption has a relational and legal import, which is to say it has both forensic and filial dimensions. Through adoption, sinners transition from children of wrath to co-heirs with Christ (or “sons in the Son”). With this objective forensic verdict comes a new relational reality, which is the filial dimension of adoption.

Because it is meaningless to say that our adoption is redeemed in the ontological sense applied to body and soul, applying this principle in an extended way creates a category mismatch. However, it is perfectly sensible to say that bodies and souls are redeemed (hence the incarnation). Because adoption is not an essential property of a person (one remains the same person with or without adoption), it is not something that even can be redeemed. Neither the legal verdict nor the altered relationship in adoption changes the essential person; therefore, the identical person becomes a child of God through gracious adoption.

Through his complete redemptive work, entailing his incarnation, death, and resurrection, Christ secures and mediates our redemption, which includes our adoption. Consequently, there is no compelling reason to argue that Christ himself was adopted. But if Christ did undergo adoption, then why not effectual calling too, in his humanity, of course? In other words, why not extend the first patristic axiom to this component of the ordo salutis to avoid arbitrariness?

To be clear, Dr. Garner does not explicitly invoke this second patristic principle (“what is not assumed is not redeemed”). However, given that the two principles are inseparable, we can fairly interact with this second axiom to test the integrity of the thesis. Because Dr. Garner grounds the first principle in a strict rule of ontological transfer, he binds himself to the internal logic of the entire patristic framework.

Therefore, by applying the same logic of redemptive transfer to the second axiom, the category mismatch becomes glaringly evident:

(1) Christ redeems only what he assumes

(2) Christ assumes only a human nature, which consists of body and soul

(3) adoption is not a component of human nature, but rather a relational-legal status

(4) therefore, adoption cannot be “assumed” or “redeemed” in the person of Christ, but must instead be mediated as a fruit of his finished work.

The first axiom, that Christ must possess what he gives, means he gives from his actual, eternal being, not a status or relationship he earned later. The second axiom, that Christ only redeems what he assumes, applies strictly to the essential parts of human nature, body and soul. Because adoption is a forensic and filial status, not a part of human nature itself, it falls outside the scope of both principles. Therefore, our legal standing and relational sonship are the fruits of Christ’s finished work, meaning Christ did not need to be adopted himself. Either way we turn, the adoption thesis is unsupportable by both inseparable axioms.

“Two governing points drive Dr. Letham’s critique—one definitional and one axiomatic. Dr. Letham’s analysis rides on the meaning of ‘adoption’ and Aquinas’ axiom he summarizes to mean that sonship and personhood are coextensive. Unless the constraints of his definition of adoption and this axiom are found to be correct, the validity of his concerns vanishes.”

For the sake of argument, let us assume that two distinct points drive Dr. Letham’s critique, one definitional and one axiomatic. Further assume, Letham’s analysis relies on a particular definition of adoption and an Aquinian axiom, which he interprets to mean that sonship and personhood are coextensive. In response, Dr. Garner assumes, with little argumentation, that Dr. Letham’s entire critique stands or falls exclusively on this precise definition of adoption. Garner implies that Letham’s concerns vanish if these exact semantic constraints are not met, creating an unproven, all-or-nothing dilemma.

This approach is overly dismissive. Challenging a definition does not automatically invalidate an entire position. Even if one adopts a different definition of adoption or an alternative reading of Aquinas, valid concerns may still remain. Dr. Garner fails to offer an internal critique, one that enters Letham’s framework on its own terms, to expose internal arbitrariness or inconsistency. Without this, Dr. Letham’s broader exegetical, theological, historical, and philosophical arguments remain unaddressed; even a flawed argument does not disappear without adequate refutation. Nor does it disappear by re-asserting one’s own position.

At the very least, even if Dr. Garner’s proposal is not identical to ancient adoptionism, he bears the burden of proof to demonstrate how his thesis is sufficiently decoupled from historic heresy. Given the novelty of his claims, he must own this challenge.

“Aquinas’s axiomatic insistence that persons are adopted, not natures, is one of several ways he participates in the critically important and effective rejection of the Christological heresy of adoptionism, according to which Jesus Christ was born fully human (but not the Son of God) and was later ‘adopted’ as God’s Son.” 

True, Aquinas deployed this axiom against adoptionism. However, is the force of Aquinas’ axiom limited to a non-divine Christ who is born fully human? That adoptionism denies the eternal generation of the Son seems at face value insufficient to vindicate Garner’s position in the face of Aquinas. In fact, Aquinas’ polemic is of little use unless it can also be applied to Garner’s thesis. After all, is it reasonable to believe that Aquinas was merely arguing for the deity of Christ, while leaving open the possibility of Christ’s later adoption? Whether a divine person is the starting point or not does not, at least in any obvious sense, undermine the axiom that only persons are adopted. The axiom blocks both paths. For Dr. Garner to claim Aquinas, (not necessarily as an ally but as a non-opponent) he would have to allow for Aquinas to accept a divine person being adopted in his humanity. However, if Aquinas were to have accepted the adoption thesis, then it is hard to understand how he would not have undermined his own polemic against the adoptionism he had in view. (He might have more easily focused on the eternal Sonship of Christ.)

One may not effectively declare “I’m not an adoptionist, therefore, the axiom doesn’t apply”

Dr. Garner’s loophole relies on an argument from silence, implicitly claiming that because Aquinas did not explicitly state a divine person cannot be adopted, he left the door open for a divine person to undergo adoption in his humanity. The implication of finding compatibility with Aquinas operates under an informal fallacy by misplacing the burden of proof. The loophole is only valid if it can be shown that Aquinas denied that sonship and adoption belong strictly to a person, not a nature. In other words, Dr. Garner must show that Aquinas deliberately left a back door open for this theory, rather than simply omitting it because his existing definitions of personhood had already rendered it impossible.

Dr. Garner must address the challenge: Aquinas did not need to explicitly forbid the adoption thesis if his contextual definitions of personhood and adoption are already mutually exclusive.

Let’s now hear from The Angelic Doctor himself.

“I answer that, Sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or person, not to the nature; whence in I:32:3 we have stated that Filiation is a personal property. Now in Christ there is no other than the uncreated person or hypostasis, to Whom it belongs by nature to be the Son. But it has been said above (Article 1, Reply to Objection 2), that the sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship: nor can a thing be said to participate in what it has essentially. Therefore Christ, Who is the natural Son of God, can nowise be called an adopted Son. But according to those who suppose two persons or two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, no reason prevents Christ being called the adopted Son of God.”

Summa Theologiae (III, Q. 23, A. 4)

Aquinas could not be clearer. Since Christ is an uncreated divine person, he is already the natural Son by nature and, therefore, cannot “participate” in what he has essentially. Therefore, Christ “can nowise be called an adopted Son.” By this calculation, at least for Aquinas, the adoption thesis is a species of adoptionism, not orthodoxy.

“The early church rejected adoptionism and Nestorianism because these theologies are dangerously wrong. They misrepresent the Person of Christ and his soteric work, and thereby always require stout rebuttal. The Son of God is the eternal Son. He did not acquire divine status or assume divine proprieties. In his incarnation, he did not become two persons. To affirm otherwise is heretical, and such dangerous errors should never be treated lightly.”

If the eternal Son did not acquire divine status, and the incarnation does not produce two persons, then how does this not comport with the classical position that the resurrection entails only the manifestation and mediatorial exercise of eternal Sonship in the assumed human nature, and not an attainment of a new filial status that he lacked before?

(At the close, I will address the implicit dualism between the eternal Son and a resurrected Christ, created by the fabrication of Christ’s adoption, along with the devastating soteric implications of the adoption thesis.)

“Yet despite this dictate to continue searching Scripture for fuller understanding of Christ’s Person and work, Dr. Letham critiques my writings on Christ’s adoption only in terms of church history and the conciliar councils and not with reference to the biblical and covenantal insights emerging from post-Reformation reformed scholarship—including that of the Westminster divines, nor even to the redemptive-historical insights of the biblical theology pioneered by Geerhardus Vos.”

If the historic Church is correct, then utilizing ecumenical councils as a benchmark is not rigid at all. It’s foundational. After all, if these councils don’t define orthodoxy, what does?

If the adoption thesis cannot survive conciliar scrutiny, it simply fails the highest standard of orthodoxy. Furthermore, because the Westminster sandards did not alter settled Christology, any thesis that violates the boundaries of Chalcedon by logical extension contradicts Westminster as well. If contemporary insights collide with catholic tradition, then they do not expand historic orthodoxy, they correct it! Ultimately, one cannot logically claim the historic Church was right while simultaneously arguing that its boundaries were wrong.

“In other words, if Christ’s sonship can only be viewed in accordance with his divinity, we risk eclipsing the critical force of his incarnation as true man and Last Adam.”

The eternal Son becomes the Last Adam precisely because the divine person unites himself to a true human nature. Reducing sonship to something attained in the human work of Christ blurs the distinction between person and nature or else implies the human nature (or the composite person) acquires sonship independently, which entails the philosophical absurdity of a self-forming agent who acts in his own ontological formation!

For an entity to bring its own essential identity into being before it fully exists as that identity is a philosophical howler. Yet this philosophical loop is entailed by the adoption thesis: A non-son cannot act to earn a Sonship he does not yet possess, while an existing Son cannot act to earn a Sonship he already has. Therefore, if you cannot act to create your own identity, and you cannot act to earn what you already have, then Dr. Garner’s idea of a historically attained Sonship completely unravels.

In order to avoid the monstrous implications of the adoption thesis, we simply affirm that a single hypostasis cannot possess dual relations of sonship toward the same divine Subject without introducing a redundant or conflicting relational plurality within that person. (More on that at the close.)

“On behalf of his people and in obedience to the Father, this Last Adam and Davidic Son completed his career faithfully and flawlessly. Moving from Christ to Christian, Christ’s royal and filial attainment marked the culmination of his redemptive work, so that now resurrected, the Son became the “Firstborn among many brothers” (Rom. 8:29).”

“Moving from Christ to Christian” works nicely with a two person Christology.

Why not just take the commonsense approach that Romans 8:29 presents Christ as the pattern (conformed to his image) and preeminent one (firstborn, denoting rank and priority, not origin or adoption)? Similarly, Colossians 1:18 and 1 Corinthians 15:20 reinforce this with “firstborn from the dead” and “first fruits,” which speak of resurrection priority and representative headship. I find no change in filial status from non-son to Son. 

“These brothers are adopted sons, and for them to be so, in Paul’s mind, Christ Jesus had to become the First among them.”

This infers too much. Believers are adopted into union with the eternal Son (Romans 8:15-17, 23; Galatians 4:4-7), who is already the only begotten Son by nature. Accordingly, why must we accept that Christ’s preeminence as elder brother and firstborn does not simply flow from his Person and work, and not from him undergoing an adoptive process parallel to ours? I was taught for years that “what Christ has by nature, we gain by gracious adoption.” The adoption thesis denies this foundational, salvific principle by grounding our sonship in Christ’s humanity!

The “sons in the Son” motif works well, but only if our adoptive sonship is derivative and gracious, grounded in the Second Person’s natural and eternal sonship.

“Only by this successful obedience to his Father, does Christ attain his exalted filial status and secure the inheritance, and by his marvelous and magnanimous grace, he bestows this sonship benefit upon his brothers—the filial benefit, which the Apostle Paul uniformly calls adoption.”

The language of “attain” and “exalted filial status” is indeed the flashpoint. Exaltation is real (Philippians 2:9-11; Hebrews 1:3–4), but it is the incarnate Son, in his humanity, who receives the name, glory, and inheritance that rightly belongs to him as Lord and heir as the divine Second Person. Hebrews 1 contrasts the Son with angels and applies Psalm 2 and 110 to him in his messianic office, but the chapter opens with his eternal generation and divine nature, not a Son who is lacking sonship in any sense. This complements the biblical creed of Christ being vindicated in the Spirit (1 Timothy 3:16) after completing his earthly mission.

“So, what about Dr. Letham’s insistence upon the person/son coterminosity axiom? As noted above, this axiom served a useful purpose in confronting the heresy of adoptionism. But it is critical to recognize the whole of the New Testament surges with filial language that extends its conceptual and theological reach beyond the ontological/hypostatic (John 1:1, Heb. 1:3).”

This seems to be another instance of overlaying a thesis upon a text and then saying, “See, there it is!” Prioritizing biblical theology over systematic theology strips away the essential guardrails against dangerous proof-texting.

This axiom (sonship is coextensive with personhood) protects the unity of Christ’s person. Eternal sonship texts (John 1, Hebrews 1, etc.) set the foundation, whereas economic sonship fulfills the mission of that same Son. We may not reverse the order. That’s the material point. By extending sonship “forward” into attainment leads to a species of adoptionism that the axiom guards against, even if qualifiers (“in a certain sense” and “as Last Adam”) are added.

Moving To A Few Remarks Levied Against Dr. Tipton:

“For those puzzled by this recent opposition to the “resurrection as adoption” thesis, open explanation for Dr. Tipton’s reversal of view is surely in order. A scholar is fully entitled to change his position, but after 20 years of teaching it, the critique of another scholar who propounds this view is simply not a satisfactory way of providing a recantation, especially when the proposal is now thought to be heterodox.”

Some things just must be said. This fails the test of logical soundness by attacking a scholar’s personal biography instead of engaging with his actual arguments. By focusing on Tipton’s 20-year history of teaching the “resurrection as adoption” thesis, Dr. Garner commits ad hominem and tu quoque fallacies. The duration of a past belief does not dictate the factual accuracy of a current position. (Also, what is relevant to the question of whether Dr. Tipton changed his views is not how he framed his previous beliefs, but what he meant by certain structures. This sort of nuance applies to Van Til’s construct of the Trinity as well as Hodge’s use of subordination. Infelicity of structure does not imply heterodoxy.)

It won’t do to assert that a critique of another scholar is an unsatisfactory “recantation.” This judges the present critique based on its origin and academic etiquette rather than its content. It cleverly shifts the focus away from Christological doctrine and toward institutional protocol. Finally, I cannot object too strongly against using terms like “heterodox” if an argument has accompanied the claim, which in the case of Dr. Tipton, it has.

“Exchanges between theologians seeking to refine and clarify positions can, in principle, prove to be quite useful to the Church. Published works open the door for public critique and I sincerely welcome such. But misrepresentation serves no one.”

We are halfway through the response and I’ve yet to see a defense of the adoption thesis or a critique of Dr. Tipton’s actual arguments. Now there needs to be a defense for Dr. Garner’s claim of Dr. Tipton’s misrepresentation. This discussion has unfortunately morphed.

“To the matters of substance, Dr. Tipton’s contention that I teach that Christ needed redemption himself and that his adoption bore redemptive efficacy for him is simply careless. The idea that our sinless Savior personally needs redemption and adoption is repugnant and blasphemous.”

Now that is a misrepresentation of Dr. Tipton, which stems from Dr. Garner’s misunderstanding.

What needs to be untangled is not whether person S states P, but whether S’s thesis (T) implies P.

Consider this basic argument. If all candidates for adoption are lost and Christ is a candidate for adoption (by definition of T), then Christ needed redemption. Since Christ did not need redemption, he wasn’t a candidate for adoption. This basic reductio does not imply that S actually teaches all of the implications of T.

Even though Dr. Garner rejects the major premise (all candidates for redemption are lost) he is unnecessarily defensive. He is defending against a charge of personal heresy that was never actually made. When a critic runs with the implications of the adoption thesis in this way, they are essentially saying: “Based on standard Reformed definitions of adoption, the thesis leads to a dangerous conclusion.” They are not saying: “Dr. Garner explicitly teaches that Christ needed redemption.”

Accordingly, Dr. Garner’s response conflates systemic coherence with personal confession. He mistakes a critique of the unintended implications of his theological model for an assault on his personal orthodoxy.

By failing to see this distinction, Dr. Garner has unfairly impugned the integrity of Dr. Tipton rather than addressing the logic of the debate. I feel certain Dr. Garner does not want to do that.

Finally, when critics demonstrate that Dr. Garner’s thesis logically implies a flawed Christology, he cannot adequately defend his system by citing his own explicit denials of that flaw. Our theology is not somehow insulated by our bottom line confession or personal piety. Accordingly, the issue is not so much what Garner intends to teach, but what his thesis logically demands.

Under the principle of logical entailment, since Dr. Garner is committed to the principles of his thesis, he is bound to the necessary consequences of their premises. This gets into intentionality and cognitive limits. Although Dr. Garner is responsible for promoting heterodoxy, he certainly doesn’t intend it. However, given the devastating critiques of his project, he should adjust his beliefs to avoid intending heterodoxy. (Here, in a recent essay of mine on “non-closure of intentions under known entailment” I address these sorts of principles in the context an inadequate polemics deployed by some philosophical Calvinists.)

Close:

Because the adoption thesis fails on both soteriological and metaphysical grounds, it must be rejected as unsustainable.

Soteriological failure:

We must decide whether Christ’s mediation flows from his eternal identity or requires a newly acquired status. To decide in favor of the adoption thesis is to affirm a division in the Son’s relation to the Father, suggesting that the one Person subsists not only in two natures, but in two competing modes of sonship.

If Christ were not yet a Son in his humanity until the resurrection, he would not have been the true mediator between God and man throughout his passion, in which case his priestly, intercessory prayer in Gethsemane would not have been efficacious. In turn, a delayed sonship would have left the cross occupied by a mere candidate for glory, rather than the Lord of Glory Himself, effectively stripping the atonement of its mediatory efficacy.

Coming at this from a slightly different angle, if Christ’s adoption is requisite for mediatory-reconciliation between God and man, and that adoption wasn’t attained until after the resurrection, then God could not have been in Christ reconciling the world unto himself (2 Corinthians 5:19; 1 Timothy 2:5); for how can a Savior who has not yet become a Son in his humanity mutually co-inhere with the Father in order for God to be reconciled at the cross?

Furthermore, redemption accomplished and redemption applied, would entail the natural Son in the first instance and the “Son par excellence” in the second. Consequently, the adoption thesis creates a redemptive divide in the external work of redemption by altering (i) the Christ who accomplishes redemption on the cross prior to his adoption, from (ii) the Christ through whom that redemption is applied as the eschatological, adopted Son. Because the inseparable operations require a unified divine action for all external acts, altering the Son’s personal status between the accomplishment and application of redemption disrupts the ordered unity of the Trinitarian economy.

Aside from salvation, if Christ’s adoptive sonship was only attained at the resurrection, we are left with a liturgical vacuum in the Gospels. For instance, how do we account for Jesus’ command to his disciples to pray “Our Father” if the very basis for their adoption, the Son’s own adoption, was not yet operative? In other words, when Jesus taught his disciples to pray, it was to their Father, yet how can they have the Father in their humanity if Christ in his own humanity remained fatherless? Jesus would have been teaching a pattern of prayer to his disciples that his own Christological status had not yet validated for himself. This presents a unique challenge for the adoption thesis, but not for classical Christology, wherein the mediator acts from his eternal, natural sonship alone. Now if Dr. Garner acknowledges that Christ authorizes this prayer according to his natural and eternal sonship, then one must ask what need remains for an adoptive status if his natural sonship is already entirely sufficient.

Metaphysical failure:

The mystery of one person possessing two distinct natures presents no Christological conflict. However, this same parallel cannot be applied to relations. Because relations terminate in the person rather than the nature, Dr. Garner’s thesis, that a single hypostasis maintains a dual relationship of sonship toward the same divine Subject, ends in an immediate philosophical bind. Specifically, if the two relations are collapsed into one unified filial bond within the single Person, the thesis reduces to a tautology or category error, whereby the adopted Christ’s relation becomes indistinguishable from the eternal Son’s filial relation, rendering the language of distinct adoption empty or redundant. However, if the relations are truly differentiated (a natural divine sonship and a distinct adoptive human sonship), the single hypostasis splits in two. The human nature would require its own distinct relational terminus to function as a subject of adoption, effectively introducing a second personal subject. Functionally, this is Nestorianism.

The Final Question: Why Can Christ Have Two Wills But Not Two Identities?

We must be able to answer: Why don’t two natures and wills create the same Christological conflict as the adoption thesis?

Without being able to answer this question satisfactorily, I don’t think the cumulative case against the adoption thesis suffers. However, being able to explain why two natures and wills don’t trigger a Christological conflict in the way two filial relationships do, I believe, seals the debate entirely.

Ontological duality (two natures with their respective faculties e.g., wills) does not divide Christological unity, because faculties belong to the natures and are exercised by the one Person. Relational duality (two distinct sonships), on the other hand, does divide personal unity because filiation terminates in the Person. Herein lies the crux: A divine Person can wield two sets of natural operations without philosophical conflict; whereas he cannot be two different sons to the same Father without either (i) reducing adoption to a mere metaphor or (ii) compromising the unity of his Person. 

Because this novel adoption thesis cannot survive exegetical, historical, and especially metaphysical scrutiny without compromising the unity of the incarnate Christ or the integrity of the atonement, it must be rejected as incompatible with Chalcedonian Christology.