Philosophical Theology

At the heart of Molinism is Middle Knowledge (MK), God’s knowledge of true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) – i.e. God’s knowledge of what creatures would freely do under all sets of circumstances. Now, of course, Augustinians also believe that if there are CCFs, then an omniscient God must have knowledge of them. However, unlike Molinists, Augustinians maintain that such divine knowledge is only possible if causal divine determinism is true, which eliminates a need for middle knowledge – a knowledge of truth that cannot be appropriated either under God’s natural or free knowledge. (As I argue here, and more fully develop here, Augustinians should ground such counterfactuals in God’s free knowledge of what he would determine and not in God’s natural knowledge of what is necessary or possible.)

If God (eternally) knows that I would freely type this post under C conditions, then it is true that I would freely type this post under C conditions (otherwise God could not know it). For the Molinist, the truth that I would freely type this post exists without any truth-maker – a determining source of the propositional truth bearer: Ron would type Molinism post under C conditions. (Let that sink in, that MK contemplates some truths exist without anything to make them true.) That is because Molinists deny that free choices are causally determined. By denying causal divine determinism in this way, Molinist are unable to “ground” the eternal truth value of counterfactual freedom. Nothing or nobody makes CCFs eternally true. Molinists deny that God determines the truth value of CCFs and they also (rightly) deny that free moral agents retroactively cause eternal truth values after having chosen in time (or in another possible world). Consequently, Molinists admit that God knows certain truths that they believe are neither necessary nor freely divinely-determined. These truths are simply there, eternally existing alongside God and his divine will, (which, as I argue here and more forcefully here, would make such would-counterfactuals functionally necessarily-true in all feasible worlds as opposed to contingently true). Obviously, such a philosophical construct denies the historic Christian faith by implicitly denying that God alone is from everlasting and the ultimate source of all things visible and invisible. It smacks at Dualism.

Another problem with Molnism is that it operates under the philosophical notion that creaturely freedom entails libertarian freedom. Libertarian freedom, or as it is often referred – libertarian free will (LFW), is a philosophical position that entails that free will is incompatible with causal determinism. We are asked to believe that for a choice to be free, it is possible that it not occur under the same exact circumstances in which it truly would occur, yet without God’s will grounding its contingent outcome. The problem with such a musing about indeterminism is that God would know contrary truths (the outcome and the possibility of a contrary outcome), which is logically impossible! As long as it is possible that I not type this post given that I would, it cannot be true in this possible world that I in fact would (or would not) type this post. The outcome defies a truth value. In which case, God could not know I would (or would not) type this post, which limits God’s exhaustive omniscience.

Aside from the fact that LFW cannot be derived from Scripture – yet causal divine determinism can, LFW is too ambitious of a Christian position. For to subscribe to LFW is to affirm a species of theological dualism. Also, if taken to its logical conclusion, LFW leads to Open Theism, a heresy that limits God’s exhaustive omniscience.